Discussion Paper on Transport Planning in Sydney to 1975

Occasional Paper

Transport planning in urban areas is a complex task demanding consideration not only of transport problems, but also of land-use planning and the provision of other services. A range of service and planning agencies and interest groups are involved directly and indirectly in transport planning and they interact at various stages and in various ways throughout the planning process. The effectiveness of this process and consequently the quality of transport services provided, depends to an important degree on the interaction between these bodies.
A DISCUSSION PAPER OF TRANSPORT PLANNING
IN SYDNEY TO 1975

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A. Sinclair

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FOREWORD

Transport planning in urban areas is a complex task demanding consideration not only of transport problems, but also of land-use planning and the provision of other services. A range of service and planning agencies and interest groups are involved directly and indirectly in transport planning and they interact at various stages and in various ways throughout the planning process. The effectiveness of this process and consequently the quality of transport services provided, depends to an important degree on the interaction between these bodies.

This paper presents the results of research carried out by staff of the former Commonwealth Bureau of Roads. The analysis is, as most political-administrative assessments inevitably, controversial and based on data that is qualitative, imprecise and open to interpretation. There are no clear-cut solutions to the problems identified. Nevertheless, research in this area can stimulate and enhance discussion by focussing attention upon specific problem areas and alternative ways of effecting reform. It is with this aim that this Bureau, created by the amalgamation of the Bureau of Roads and the former Bureau of Transport Economics, publishes this Discussion Paper.

Sydney was chosen for this study because it is Australia's most populous and complex city and therefore much of the analysis would have relevance for other cities in Australia. It was not chosen because the political-administrative framework for transport planning and decision-making in Sydney were considered to warrant particular attention. The paper is not intended, nor should it be viewed, as a policy document for reform in Sydney.

Further, some of the events referred to in the paper occurred some time ago and the significant changes that have occurred more recently in the organisation and administration of transport planning in Sydney have been aimed at overcoming problems that are highlighted in this report. In particular, the NSW Ministry of
Transport has pointed to the developing co-ordinative role of the Urban Transport Advisory Committee, similar to that recommended in the report, the technical support provided by its Urban Transport Study Group and the increasing role of the Ministry in matters of resource allocation, co-ordination and policy analysis.

While these changes are acknowledged, the lessons to be drawn from past experience of transport planning arrangements continue to be valid.

The paper was prepared by Mr A. Rattray and Ms A. Sinclair under the direction of Mr J. Stanley in the Transport Planning Division of the recently abolished Commonwealth Bureau of Roads. The Bureau of Transport Economics, in publishing this paper acknowledges the assistance provided by Dr M. Painter, Mr R. Gibbons, Ms H. Brezzo, Ms T. Horowitz, Mr A. Bliss and Mr G. Sheather in the preparation of this paper, and Mr R. King and others for their valuable comments. The Bureau, of course, accepts full responsibility for the paper's publication, and neither the consultants who prepared background material nor those who generously commented on the drafts carry responsibility for any inaccuracies or errors.

(G.K. Reid)
Acting Director

Bureau of Transport Economics
Canberra

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**ABBREVIATIONS**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BLF</td>
<td>Builders Labourers Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Cumberland County Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRAG</td>
<td>Coalition of Resident Action Groups</td>
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<td>CUMTAC</td>
<td>County of Cumberland Transport Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMR</td>
<td>Department of Main Roads</td>
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<td>HC</td>
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<td>RAG</td>
<td>Resident Action Group</td>
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<td>SATS</td>
<td>Sydney Area Transportation Study</td>
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<td>SCRA</td>
<td>Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority</td>
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<td>SPA</td>
<td>State Planning Authority</td>
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<td>SRA</td>
<td>State Roads Authority</td>
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<td>Sydney Region Outline Plan</td>
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PREFACE

This report was written for a range of readers not all of whom will wish or need to read all the chapters. Chapters One and Five, introducing the problem examined, approach and key concepts and summarising and concluding, are essential reading. Chapter Two, discussing the existing planning process is principally descriptive and need only be read by those with a detailed interest in the mechanics of planning in Sydney. Chapter Three analyses this existing process, identifying recurrent problems and their implications for the consumer of transport services. Chapter Four assesses the need for new emphases and proposes some improvements to transport planning in Sydney.
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

ABSTRACT:
This paper focuses on the political and administrative environment of transport planning in Sydney to develop an understanding of the complex and diverse range of bodies involved in planning aspects of transport and land development. Planning is defined as a process of interest representation described and evaluated in terms of the perspective of the consumer(1) of goods and services. The coordination of programmes directed towards particular consumer groups constitutes an important aspect of the approach outlined. In spite of the difficulties associated with a report focusing on political administrative characteristics, it is argued that such an approach is fundamental to an understanding of existing inter-organisational relationships and the nature and scope of possible improvements.

THE PROBLEM

"There are one or more of 28 Federal, 53 State and 222 Local Government Agencies as well as private organisations and individuals concerned with any body or group who attempts to plan a transport system in New South Wales"(2).

(1) The term consumer should be interpreted broadly to encompass any person affected by a particular policy or plan whether they are affected as beneficiaries (e.g. as road users who save time by a road improvement) or whether they are adversely affected (e.g. by increased traffic noise caused by a road improvement). The notion of 'consumer' is not intended to exclude from planning, consideration of the physical environment. However the environment can only receive due attention from the activities of human beings. While this does indicate that the word consumption is used in an unusual way, it should be taken to include 'consumption' of environmental 'goods' (e.g. noise, wilderness areas).

Transport and land use planning are undertaken in Sydney by a large number of governmental and semi-governmental agencies. These agencies interact formally and informally amongst themselves and with many private interest groups, corporations and individuals. Planning complementary land-use patterns and transport facilities is an issue involving complex political and administrative relations. Features of the political and administrative system clearly influence to a substantial extent the way in which problems are conceptualised, and policies devised and implemented. This report examines the structure and nature of transport planning in Sydney, using this analysis to reflect on aspects of, and problems associated with existing planning.

Any initiative to improve the integration of transport planning and land-use planning must operate in a sensitive administrative and political environment. It is this fact which explains the paucity of work in this field by practising planners. Only a handful of books and articles, almost all by academics, can be found in the literature. These, in any case, often concentrate on general statements of belief about political decision-making. In spite of the controversial nature of a report focusing on political and administrative features it is argued that this subject is of such importance that its sensitivity should not act as a deterrent to analysis.

APPROACH OF THE REPORT

In this report it is the perspective of the consumer of transport services that is adopted as the basic criterion for evaluation and for the selection of organisations for detailed analysis. Policies as they are formulated and become effective have differential effects on groups of consumers. In some cases they impose particular costs without corresponding benefits to groups within the community. Disadvantaged groups may be particularly penalised because costs are disproportionately high in relation to their
capacity to pay. When describing the interaction of institutions and policies, the effects on particular groups of consumers and the community as a whole (concepts termed 'equity' and 'efficiency') will be used as a basis for assessing existing planning arrangements.

An approach that utilises an institutional orientation has been chosen in preference to a more general appraisal of the process of urban development for a number of reasons. A general appraisal must inevitably focus on broad comments about organisational and administrative machinery, on shared organisational problems and concerns and on broad political-administrative and inter-authority interfaces. While this is obviously an essential perspective, it gives insufficient weight to individual personalities and organisational idiosyncracies that are found in particular policy areas, and that contribute significantly to the role a particular organisation plays in urban development. The impact of some factors, for example the tax structure, and the subsidies provided to particular groups throughout the planning process, are not given detailed consideration. Obviously institutions other than those chosen, such as public hospitals, schools and universities, port and airport authorities, significantly affect the level at which services for consumer are accommodated. The organisations chosen for detailed study reflect the authors' assessment of those which play or should play an important role in the existing planning process from the transport consumer's viewpoint, (outline of the report on page 7 details those organisations that have been considered).

Some evaluation is inevitable in the compilation of a picture of existing planning. The incidents and case studies described are inevitably selective and to some extent open to interpretation. Where possible the perspectives of a number of commentators have been utilised to present a 'balanced' view of events. It has been treated as necessary in this paper, to include only those interpretations which appear to have been reached independently by a number of commentators operating from a number of perspectives, and utilising well-documented case studies.
An approach which deals with organisations individually, is also inevitably susceptible to the criticism that it is partisan, and that particular organisations are being victimised. That is certainly not the aim of this paper. A wide range of case studies of urban development have been utilised as a basis for conclusions. Also for each government authority it will be stressed that its performance must be judged in terms of the responsibilities stated in the Act under which it was established. Any criticism of its failure to co-ordinate its policies, exchange information or engage in comprehensive planning with a concern for implications, must be viewed as a criticism of the framework in which specific responsibilities were conceptualised and charged to specific bodies. In the following sections it will be noted that authorities typically have narrowly defined responsibilities and that any attempt to go beyond these boundaries is a voluntary gesture undertaken for a variety of reasons. Without specific incentives for co-ordination between bodies, or constraints for adequate planning within bodies, it is unreasonable to expect such things to occur. If nothing else, a detailed study of existing authorities should illuminate this fact and the need for a review of planning machinery and an updated and critical review of existing responsibilities.

CONCEPTS

Throughout the studies leading up to this paper, the concept of planning utilised has developed considerably. A range of alternative concepts of planning seem to be held by different commentators. Some use an ideal concept, for example 'planning is the optimum allocation of resources'. Some distinguish public sector planning from private sector planning, or planning from decision-making. Some portray planning as a constraint on development ('planning stifles development') while others (1)

argue that planning regularly confers unearned income on property owners. Given the absence of agreement about what planning is, and what it is for, it was seen as important to obtain both a precise understanding of what planning actually was in practice, and to develop conceptions of good planning. An understanding of the characteristics of good planning arose from the study of how planning worked in practice.

The perspective of the final consumer of planned goods and services emerged as a vital component of the concept of planning which developed. Two questions seemed important. How does planning as practiced affect the consumers of planned development? On what criteria could planning be improved from the viewpoint of the consumer?

Utilising the perspective of the consumer seemed to overcome most of the difficulties with the variety of conceptions of planning.

(a) It allows, in concept at least, for comparison of alternative planning mechanisms, for example the operation of a government instrumentality versus a market system.

(b) It links planning to politics by recognising that planning cannot be a value free technical process and by including decision-making as part of planning. There are two main reasons for this. Given the focus on consumers it would be an abstract and difficult task to simply assess the effects of plans independently of decisions. It would in addition require a separate study of the effect of decisions on consumers. Secondly, in preparing plans or policies, planners make a variety of decisions or value judgements which affect the kinds of recommendations they produce. To see such a process as purely technical might obscure scrutiny of the nature of the judgements actually made.
To include decision making within planning should not be taken as a suggestion that planners in government agencies should make political decisions. What has been suggested is that politicians have, for the purposes of this paper, been included within the planning process. The focus is on the effect of implemented plans on consumers, not whether those effects arise from value judgements made by planners or decisions by politicians.

(c) The studies of planning have indicated that each sector has its own conceptions of what constitutes good planning. The focus on the consumer encourages examination of the impact of disparate kinds of facility and service provision on those affected. It allows exploration of the relationship between planned developments from the consumer's viewpoint.

Taking the viewpoint of the consumer led to the first and most important criterion for describing and evaluating planning: in terms the needs and interests which are represented in it. Planning was therefore defined as a process of representation of needs and interests. Planning can be directed in the interests of any group and it is of basic importance to understand which group is being served by planned developments. Planning may be directed to serve any group but it is argued (Chapter 4) that it should serve the wide range of groups which exist in society.

Consumers have needs for a particular mix of publicly provided goods. For example, a low income housing policy which located tenants far from their potential or actual employment might provide good housing but high unemployment and not be in the interests of that low income group. This observation led to a focus on the relationships between organisations providing different kinds of facilities.

(1) The term 'representation' is not intended to connote parliamentary representation, though the meaning is closely related. Representation constitutes the extent to which the needs and interests of particular consumers are catered for at any phase of the planning process.
Three terms have been used to characterise the relationship between organisations, and an understanding of how these terms are used is crucial to the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn. While communication refers simply to an exchange of information between organisations through formal or informal procedures, co-ordination implies not only concerted action, but also some shared conception of how pieces of action fit into a whole. Co-ordination refers to concerted action towards a specific end. It does not necessarily imply complete unity of aims or consensus between bodies, only that a number of their specific objectives are not mutually exclusive. Lack of co-ordination may occur because of disparate action or implicitly or explicitly contradictory objectives. While co-ordination may be geared towards any set of objectives integration implies co-ordination towards the diverse needs of a wide range of groups which exist in society. To achieve integrated planning, mechanisms for co-ordination are required at each stage of the planning process.

To describe the groups represented in planning or the type of co-ordination employed, a series of analytically discrete stages in the planning process need to be examined:

- problem definition or identification of areas for improvement;
- generation of alternative solutions;
- evaluation of alternatives;
- ratification (facilitates acceptance of a final plan)(1);

(1) The ratification of a plan concerns any attempt to establish the credibility of the planning process or the merits of the planned development, either in the eyes of a consumer group or other organisations. While according to some definitions 'public relations' is excluded as a legitimate planning activity, attempts to establish credibility are so demonstrably part of planning that it should not be excluded. Further, good planning is highly credible planning which does serve and is seen to serve legitimate interests of consumer groups.
Planning then can be described in terms of the interests it represents and how the actions of Governmental agencies are co-ordinated towards meeting mutually reinforcing needs at each stage of the planning process. Integrated and representative planning serves a wide range of groups co-ordinated at each stage of the process by: defining problems in a broad way, examining a wide range of alternatives, ensuring that a plan is feasible, and monitoring and adjusting the implemented plan.

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

The order of the following chapters reflects the stages through which an understanding of the planning process was acquired. It was felt that a thorough understanding of relevant concepts could only be predicated on a familiarity with the way they were understood and applied in the Sydney context. The definition of concepts that has been elaborated grew out of a detailed analysis of the case studies, rather than being a starting point against which the case studies were evaluated.

The report is divided into five parts including Chapter One, the Introduction. Chapter Two comprises a detailed exploration of the existing planning process through a case study analysis of governmental bodies, private property owners and developers, resident action groups and unions. Three broad groups of governmental bodies are considered: operating and constructing authorities including the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board, the Housing Commission, the Department of Main Roads and Public Transport Commission; planning bodies including the Cumberland County Council, its successors the State Planning Authority and existing State Planning and Environment Commission, the Cumberland County Council Traffic Advisory Committee and its successor the Urban Transport Advisory Committee; and lastly...
councils, including Sydney City Council and local councils. Chapter Three draws together the themes characterising existing planning through an analysis of formal and informal inter-organisational relationships and through a description of the planning environment in which various bodies operate. It also outlines the need for improved planning. Chapter Four argues on the basis of these conclusions for some new directions to planning in Sydney and suggests how these might be implemented. In Chapter Five a summary of the main line of argument is provided together with conclusions.
CHAPTER 2 - THE EXISTING PLANNING PROCESS

ABSTRACT:
The influence of a number of bodies on decisions relating to the planning and provisions of transport services are discussed: (i) operating and construction authorities, (ii) planning bodies, (iii) councils, and (iv) speculators and developers, resident action groups, and unions. Particular examples of planning carried out by these bodies are described in order to build up a picture of how decision-making is currently undertaken and the kinds of interests represented in those decisions.

SIGNIFICANT GOVERNMENTAL BODIES AND INITIATIVES IN PLANNING

Three broad groups of governmental bodies identified as significant actors in the existing planning process are discussed in turn in the following chapter. The first group includes operating and construction authorities, the second those bodies established with formal planning objectives and the third, councils.

The case studies of governmental authorities draw as suggested, on a number of sources. Some of the events described occurred some time ago. The difficulties of gaining a complete understanding of a series of often disjointed, very recent, incidents is obvious. However, an extended time perspective is justifiable also because attitudes and habits of interaction once well entrenched, linger on, in spite of formal commitments to change. From an organisational perspective an understanding of underlying and persisting values is crucial to an interpretation of organisational potentialities for change.

In assessing the policies and actions of government bodies it is fundamentally their impact on the transport needs of groups in the community that is viewed as significant. The impact of bodies not explicitly concerned with transport is considered because their policies substantially, though indirectly create, and modify transport needs. The comments on these bodies are
inevitably specialised assessments concerned more with the impact of their performance on transport needs and demands, than on the general effectiveness of the bodies to meet their specific responsibilities. Evidence suggests that specific authorities do undertake their primary responsibilities, whether these be road construction, low cost housing, or sewerage and water provision, with vigour and efficiency. However, this Report is primarily concerned with planning, not operation or construction, and the relationship between the planning efforts in Sydney. It is in this sphere, which some authorities interpret as a minor responsibility, where the major weaknesses lie in the provision of adequate access to urban goods and services. Many of the authorities were indeed set up and given their responsibilities at a time when planning was less crucial in the provision of adequate services.

**Operating and Construction Authorities**

The selection of those government authorities which demand particular attention was obviously a difficult, but not arbitrary task. The criteria utilised was the expected impact of such bodies on the planning and execution of development in the Sydney Metropolitan area. The Water Board and Housing Commission, as the following sections indicate have been responsible for many decisions effectively shaping transport policy, by altering and adding to consumer needs for transport services. Decisions made by the Department of Main Roads and Public Transport Commissions have had a more direct impact on transport policy and developments.

**METROPOLITAN WATER, SEWERAGE AND DRAINAGE BOARD (MWSDB)**

The Water Board is a statutory body originally established under the 1924 Drainage Act and responsible to Parliament through the Minister for Works. The Board consists of 8 members, 6 of whom
are part-time, 3 nominated by the Local Government Association and 3 appointed on the basis of 'special knowledge', currently a land developer, manufacturer and an environmental scientist. The Board's main responsibilities include:

"(a) the conservation, preservation and distribution of water for domestic and other uses;

(b) the provision of reticulation and other means for the discharge of sewerage and its treatment and disposal;

(c) the construction, control and management of such stormwater channels as are ... assigned to it";

as well as the construction, operation and maintenance of new and additional water, sewerage and drainage works and the extension of new services to unsewered areas\(^{(1)}\). Its activities cover an area of approximately 11,500 square kilometres.

From an early stage the Board has operated according to five and ten year 'plans'. However, its ability to anticipate demand and provide services was particularly inhibited during the 1950's and 60's by the difficulties faced by the planning authority, the Cumberland County Council, in attempting to schedule land releases. In 1959 a new State Minister for Local Government announced the release of fifty square miles of formerly 'Green Belt' land, without any prior consultation with the authorities. The Board managed to ensure that its services would not be impaired in this new development despite its financial problems; firstly by getting private developers to pay reticulation costs, and later a contribution towards amplification costs, substantially as a refundable interest-free advance to the Board. Under the provisions of the 1963 legislation all subdivision applications are referred to the Board after they have been provision-

\(^{(1)}\) Metropolitan Water, Sewerage Drainage Act, No. 50, 1924. p. 509.
ally approved by the local council and the State Planning and Environment Commission (PEC) is currently required to certify works which the Board decides the developer should pay for. According to several accounts "no other infrastructural authority has such a connection with the planning process and one consequence has been a closer relationship between the Board's planning and that of central and local land use planners"(1).

The 'contribution policy' and Primary Fund do not apply in all cases of servicing and a lot of costs are still passed on to the community. It has been suggested that the Board has tended to service more difficult and consequently more desirable areas of Sydney (in Warringah, Ku-ring-gai, Hornsby). The costs of servicing these and new development areas are still borne to a large extent, by the community generally while often only the more affluent can afford to live there or in areas not already serviced. Consequently the Board's policy, while effecting a degree of order on development and redistributing costs to some extent, has because of its influence, had some significant negative redistributive effects on the community generally through the areas it has elected to service.

The Board has however characteristically been sensitive to the high costs of establishing services in urban sprawl areas. Like the Department of Main Roads, it has an interest in ensuring the full and efficient utilisation of existing services and in seeing that new urban development occurs in areas which are not excessively difficult or expensive to service adequately. It has conducted considerable research into the comparative cost and efficiency of urban redevelopment as opposed to outer urban and satellite development of water, sewerage and drainage facilities(2). The

constraints dictated by the per capita costs of services has been an effective input to development proposals, and these constraints have indirectly effected a degree of order on new developments of other services.

It has been noted that the Board's developer contribution policy has not only had the redistributive effect of placing the burden for land development on the subdividers, and producing increased efficiencies in the provision of services, but also imposing advance planning constraints on several developer authorities, forced to contribute to service costs and evaluate their projects in the light of the Board's programs. These include the Housing Commission, Lands Department, Planning and Environment Commission and others(1).

HOUSING COMMISSION (HC)

Established in 1941, the Housing Commission has corporate, statutory status and considerable independence from the political arena. It has five commissioners (one full-time) and its responsibilities include:

(a) the provision of housing for sale or rent for low-income groups at rentals and prices within their means;

(b) the clearance and redevelopment of sub-standard housing pockets;

(c) the acquisition and sub-division of land;

(d) the provision of housing for aged persons, government departments and emergency housing.

(1) Gibbons, R.D. op. cit. p. 159.
These responsibilities reflect the priorities of the immediate post-war period in which the Commission was established. The independence of operation it developed at this time has persisted, as have its policy emphases. The Commission has few formal links with planning bodies; it gained representation on the Urban Land Council but unlike the Water Board, it was not represented on the State Planning Authority (SPA). Liaison with other government bodies is largely through informal meetings, convened after a need or problem has been established(1).

In the past the Commission's land acquisition programme has not been formally co-ordinated with councils. Rather than a council reserving specific areas for public housing, the HC has been forced to compete with private developers in purchasing land. This has made it difficult for the Commission to respond to Federal Government initiatives in making finance available for community amenities other than housing, and Federal directives to attempt to intermingle public and private housing, rather than creating large estates. The difficulty of avoiding the segregation of public housing estates for authorities concerned to purchase cheap land, amenable to economics of scale, has been frequently noted(2). Only at a sufficiently early stage of development could effective planning ensure that cheap land be set aside for public housing, interspersed with private developments.

The relative deprivation of Housing Commission estates, particularly those in outer urban areas has been described by many commentators for example, Finch(3). King has commented: "The

(3) Finch, B. Life and Metropolitan Location, Ian Buchan Fell Research Project and Housing, Faculty of Architecture, Uni. of Sydney, July 1970. See also: Brennan, T. op. cit; Stretton, H. op. cit; King, R. 'Urban Services and Distributive Justice: A Sydney Case Study' Centre for Environmental Studies, Uni. of Melb., November, 1975.
N.S.W. Housing Commission's new stock is strongly concentrated in flats in inner suburbs and houses in outer Western and South Western suburbs. Therefore it merely strengthens the segregating effect of the market and the inequity that effect imposes"(1).

These conclusions are based on his findings that outer areas are characterised by poor access to metropolitan services (and to other services) while inner areas have poor access to local services. Little attempt has been made in areas where Housing Commission estates are located to counter the trend for the poor to pay more in balancing residential costs with other location and personal costs. The actions of other authorities have not ameliorated this segregating effect, 'the inequality of access costs in Sydney is reinforced by the tax system: buses in inner city areas are operated by the State Government and subsidised by taxes, while those in outer areas are run by private operators and wholly paid by the users ...."(2). Deprivation in non-Housing Commission outer areas (Lurnea, St. Mary's) occurs as a result of other institutional factors. He concludes that there is considerable support for the view that existing government institutions, public policy and mechanisms in the private sector, create a situation where the poor seeking to minimise dwelling costs, inevitably face "some combination of higher access costs and higher personal costs"(3).

A study of urban road based public transport undertaken by the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads found that residents of the 'Green Valley' area suffered substantial transport or location disadvantages, often paying disproportionately large amounts of their total income in transport costs(4). This area, where a number of Housing Commission developments have been located, was also found to be relatively deprived with respect to a number of social facilities and employment opportunities. Brennan has noted that poor phasing of transport facilities in public housing estates has

(1) King, R. ibid. p. 11.
(2) ibid p. 109
(3) ibid p. 95
reduced "the choice of the population in all the resources of the larger metropolitan area, including employment, welfare services and recreation"(1). He and Finch have documented the social and psychological problems associated with new public housing estates. While the Commission tenant clearly brings many problems to the estate with him, latent sources of tension are aggravated by poor facilities.

The Housing Commission's land acquisition program, in the past, has also not been co-ordinated with guidelines laid down by planning bodies. The Cumberland County Council's Plan included substantial areas rezoned for a 'green belt', however, the Commission had plans for a satellite town within this belt. The resulting compromise created the first crucial doubts regarding the Plan's credibility and the CCC's ability to protect it(2).

More recently co-operation with the PEC has become more important to the HC since its ability to spend large sums has been limited and most purchases have been made through planning bodies. Neutze has suggested that the Commission has established a pattern of close consultation with planning bodies partly as a result of the large amount of criticism directed at its Green Valley Development. "In various ways it has sought to co-ordinate its activities with those of other authorities, in order to facilitate planning of investment and land use"(3). Colman, however, still concludes his analysis of Australian State Housing Authorities with the comment that housing is treated as "an 'ad-hoc' issue" unrelated to other aspects of urban planning and "to be dealt with largely by an independent single-purpose authority"(4).

(1) Brennan, op. cit. p. 59.
(4) Colman, J. op. cit. p. 106.
The Main Roads Act of 1924 was introduced to "provide for the better construction, maintenance and financing of main roads" (1). The Act gave the Main Roads Board, consisting of three members, the powers to function as a State Road Authority. Its operations were to be financed by a County of Cumberland Main Roads Fund and a Country Main Roads Fund. The Main Roads (Amendment) Act of 1929 introduced the classification of the Main Roads System including State Highways, trunk roads and ordinary main roads, for which the DMR is still responsible. After a series of reorganisations, the Transport (Division of Functions) Act of 1932 empowered a single Commissioner to exercise powers in respect of Main Roads, Developmental Roads, Tourist Roads and Secondary Roads, as a body corporate, the Department of Main Roads.

The DMR, like the Housing Commission has been formally restricted in its influence on urban development. The planning function is given relatively minor emphasis in the existing organisational structure, although the DMR undertook some early planning initiatives including land use and population studies. There is little institutional or formal encouragement for the DMR to co-ordinate its road plans with land-use proposals from planning bodies. The conflict between the inherent interests of organisations like the DMR and State Planning Authority has been noted.

Much of the criticism that has been directed at the DMR has focused on its inflexible implementation of a radial road plan developed as a result of early studies. It has been observed that there has been insufficient recognition by the DMR of the relationship between road and land-use planning, of the extent of its influence on overall metropolitan planning and of the need to consider other factors in the planning and implementation of the road system (2). Plans put forward by the DMR have tended

(1) Main Roads Act, No. 24, 1924 p. 4.
(2) Stretton, H. op. cit. p. 270.
to be based on engineering criteria only, such as traffic generation estimates, with little or no consideration of social and environmental variables. Planning bodies themselves, with the exception of the CCC, have treated the road planning perspective as distinct and independent of other planning. The SPA's Sydney Region Outline Plan gave very little emphasis to transport in its blueprint for Sydney development.

It should be noted that the geography of the Sydney area and location of the CBD have imposed restrictions on the transportation options. However, transport plans have not been scrutinised as part of broader planning exercises. Guidelines formulated some time ago have endured, confirmed in the Sydney Area Transportation Study (SATS) commissioned by the County of Cumberland Transport Advisory Committee (CUMTAC), and constraining other planning options. Under these conditions transport and land-use plans have rarely been fully and simultaneously developed or conceptualised, or subject to ongoing review\(^1\). Without that simultaneous development a conservative bias is implicit because either the planning or transport bodies are forced to assume the continuation of well-established guidelines on the part of the other agency or agencies.

The DMR is engaged in an ongoing review of some local council projects, and of ways of maintaining and improving existing main roads and 'trouble spots'. In addition within the Department controversial technical alternatives are scrutinised, for example the desirability and feasibility of road closures and bus priority lanes, and opinions are canvassed through committee procedures. Once certain proposals are implemented by other authorities, such as the Department of Motor Transport, the DMR often attempts to assist in their implementation. However, it is significant that all of these operations, as well as in broader areas of metropolitan

and freeway planning, are largely regarded as 'technical' processes, amenable to decisions being made on the basis solely of engineering and costing criteria.

The DMR has received considerable political support for its freeway plans. Despite the State Labour Government's initial opposition, the first few miles of the Warringah expressway began under Labour in the early 1960's, costing $25 million, half of which was spent on property acquisition. Man working class houses were resumed, the occupants often being forced to move to locations much further from the city (1). Only recently has State Cabinet reviewed policy for inner urban freeway construction, in spite of DMR objections. Some inner freeway reservations, including the Western, Southern and Warringah Extension have been deleted and re-zoned for non-freeway development.

Both in its policy emphases and in the influence its policies have had on broader planning strategies and other authorities, the DMR has influenced the allocation of resources to groups in the community. The Department has projected the image that it is a body with strong public support, however its policies have catered particularly for car-owners and potential users of freeways. The interests of these groups of people have also been represented by organisations such as the NRMA. Public transport users, for example housewives and children in outer urban areas needing local services have not had such a strong voice representing their interests in the planning of transport and other services.

PUBLIC TRANSPORT COMMISSION

In 1949 a co-ordinative body was formed to attempt to control private and government transport operators and agencies, and main road construction. Opposition from private industry and the government sector, combined with unfavourable economic circum-

(1) Sandercock, L., op. cit., p. 192.
stances forced its disbandment. Later reports commissioned with the task of defining co-ordinative structures and procedures met similar opposition from entrenched institutions. In 1972 the Public Transport Commission was formed to reorganise and co-ordinate public transport operations and the bureaucracies controlling them. It consisted of three full time members, two of whom were accounts with transport experience and one transport specialist (Dr Neilsen, the Director of SATS) as well as two part time members.

The PTC was invested with a number of responsibilities. Its basic purpose was the integration through amalgamation, of the Railways Department, the Department of Government Transport and the Sydney Harbour Ferries Board. Government rail, bus and ferry services were brought together under a co-ordinated organisation responsible for improving and expanding them. The Commission was directed particularly to the need for curbing the financial drain of transport deficits on State finances. It was also given the responsibility of producing a Report within two years on existing problems in public transport and proposed remedies. The range of problems to be considered was broad, including financing, co-ordination and land-use planning, insofar as it related to the provision of interchange facilities. The potential for conflict between Commission objectives has been noted. For example the need to adopt a marketing orientation and reduce financial burdens could reduce the Commission's capacity to develop and implement effective long-term planning strategies.

The formal structures of the Commission and its responsibilities have certainly enhanced the potential for the co-ordination of public transport decisions. Its relative newness has meant there is a paucity of commentaries on its effectiveness, however it has been criticised on a number of grounds. Firstly, it has paid less attention to the planning of public transport than to ways of reducing it's deficit\(^1\). It has interpreted its respons-

ibilities narrowly, focusing on maintaining services rather than planning around less operational objectives. It has also opposed or ignored attempts at metropolitan planning, generally making no overtures to planning bodies, and demonstrating an unwillingness to negotiate with other State instrumentalities or secure representation on bodies such as the NSW Traffic Authority. Lastly, it has been argued on the basis of deficit figures, drops in patronage and cuts in and deterioration of services that the Commission has demonstrated a poor record of achievement since its inception in 1972.

However, probably the most serious difficulties the Commission faces are internal ones related to its size and internal administration. It employs approximately 48,000 people in a wide range of activities and has experienced enormous increases in wage costs. Internal conflict between functions and divisions with differing priorities has prevented a comprehensive approach to problem identification and resolution, and the absence of an embracing set of objectives has contributed to the fragmentation of efforts. The PTC has typically had a poor public image which has aggravated an already low internal morale. It is widely felt, however, that the new Chief Commissioner with a firm management commitment and substantial experience, will reverse this trend.

The most recent report by the Urban Transport Advisory Committee, (March '76) to be discussed in detail later, gives particular attention to the need for public transport improvements and for the increased availability of finance to the PTC. In spite of the Report being basically a combination of the short-term work programs of member authorities, the unprecedented emphasis on public transport could signify an enhanced role for the PTC and an expanding basis for co-operation between it and other transport

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(1) Freeman, P. "Why Sydney's Public Transport is Going Bust", National Times, August 2-7, 1976, p. 49.
(2) Ibid p. 48.
authorities. However, URTAC offers only a very broad reflection of changing policy. It does not provide any incentive for co-operation of transport with non-transport authorities, or offer guidelines that have arisen from a planning process integrated by authorities from the start about a whole range of projects being considered by the PTC. A preoccupation with internal problems could further reduce the likelihood of any systematic consideration of these projects in the light of the actions of other authorities and their social effects.

State Planning Bodies

A succession of authorities with varying powers and responsibilities have specifically undertaken planning in Sydney. The Cumberland County Council was succeeded by the State Planning Authority which was replaced in 1974 by the Planning and Environment Commission. Under the SPA, the Sydney Region Outline Plan was formulated. Following this, a special report investigating transport policy was commissioned to fill a perceived gap in information and advice. Supervising the Sydney Area Transportation Study was the Cumberland Passenger Transport Advisory Committee, established in 1965 to investigate possible ways of improving bus and rail services. This was succeeded in 1973 by the Urban Transport Advisory Committee, with a specific responsibility for long-term transport planning. URTAC is supported by the successor of SATS, a technical task force called the Urban Transport Study Group. Other advisory bodies and co-ordinating agencies such as the new Traffic Authority, have exercised powers and made decisions relevant to planning in Sydney.

THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY COUNCIL (CCC)

In 1945 the Labour Government introduced a Bill to enable local councils to regulate the use of land and to establish a Town and Country Planning Committee with strong professional representation. The Local Government Association successfully pressed for an Amendment to the Bill to increase local government rep-
representation. The Cumberland County Council was created with ten members, one representing Sydney City Council and the rest representing other local councils. Its eventual constitution demonstrated the potential for local government to influence the State Legislative Council.

The CCC's task was to produce a plan 'regulation and controlling the use of land'. Land-use specifications were expected to have considerable influence on developments in transport and other services. It was hoped therefore that this kind of plan would have secondary and tertiary effects in co-ordinating a wide range of public authorities and private developers. However, before the scheme was submitted, local councils, rather than welcoming the impetus to local planning, came to see the CCC as an infringement on their rights, a representative of State rather than local interests. The Town and Country Planning Committee, aware of this hostility, modified the scheme extensively before it was finally implemented in 1952. During this delay the staff of the Council had become demoralised and the years of uncertainty had made the public authorities sceptical of the importance of anything the CCC had to propose.

The CCC's Plan proved to be ineffective overall for a number of reasons. The 1954 Census indicated that population and land-use grew at about twice the rate anticipated by the projections on which the Plan was based(1). When it was finally implemented it could not accommodate the pressures being exerted for further development(2). Secondly, the 'principles' on which the Plan was based contained substantial unarticulated assumptions and confused objectives. The principles state the need for

- a dispersal of places of employment closer to residential areas;
- redirection of growth to urban and rural 'dispersal centres';

(1) Sandercock, L. op. cit. p. 182.
(2) Stretton, H. op. cit. p. 247
. Slum clearance and high density redevelopment in inner areas;
. an 'open space program and 'green belt' limiting urban growth;
. regional transport system of through traffic roads.

The Plan based on these principles limited the growth of the city area, suggested 'dispersal centres', a 'green belt', satellite towns, some circumferential railways and a predominantly radial major road system based on the 'Main Road Development Plan' published by the DMR in 1946. Neither the 'principles' nor the Plan allowed for flexibility or a review under changing circumstances, and this rigidity was enhanced by a reliance on outdated statutory planning techniques.

Realisation of the Plan depended upon detailed follow-up plans emanating from local councils. Councils were hostile to the Plan since they were expected to meet some of the costs of implementing it. As well as placing unrealistic demands on the expertise and interests of local government, the Plan was blatantly antagonistic to the powerful interests of CBD and outer urban developers. The Pitt Street Property Owners Defence League produced pamphlets complaining that planning was stifling development. Operating authorities, particularly the Housing Commission, had an interest in encouraging development within the green belt since the costs of establishing new facilities would have generally exceeded the costs of improving and extending services at the edge of the existing urban development. The MWSDB already had an unpublished system of servicing priorities for developing areas and the DMR has also been criticised for encouraging the CCC to 'protect' county roads in its plan, and then developing another program itself with changed routes and locations.

Many other problems and symptoms associated with the CCC plan
have been described at length\(^{(1)}\). Criticisms focus on its planning assumptions, disregard for other organisational priorities and resources, and the nature and operation of the body itself (non-technical, isolated staffing policy). Perhaps the most significant set of factors contributing to the CCC's demise relate to its role in the political and institutional context of planning. Already there were a number of authorities undertaking planning, and the CCC did not directly advise the Minister, the final arbiter of planning objectives. His principal planning advisers were the officers of the Department of Local Government and Town and Country Planning Committee. As has been suggested, the CCC's potential as a planning Body was also undermined by a common problem experienced by authorities whose members are selected on a representative basis. Its members saw their function in the new body as representing the interests of the local authority from which they had been selected, rather than the more encompassing interests of a planning body. As with other representative bodies the CCC focused on clarifying administrative arrangements and regulations in planning rather than on developing planning strategies of concern to all authorities.

From the perspective of the consumer of transport services the ineffectiveness of the CCC and its Plan resulted in continued expansion of the city, a half-hearted commitment to the satellite towns, the progressive abandonment of the Green Belt and creation of depressed fringe development areas. The succession of 'suspensions' to the Plan initiated by the Minister for Local Government meant that unexpected deviations in proposals were made, creating sudden new pressures on services. While the Housing Commission was proposing to develop a large portion of green belt land, the

\(^{(1)}\) Sandercock, L. *op. cit.* p. 183.; Stretton, H. *op. cit.* p. 245-6
Harrison P., "City Planning in Australia, What Went Wrong" in Australian Cities: Chaos or Planned Growth, AIPS, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1966
Troy, P.N. "Urban Road Planning in an Australian Context, Economic History Urban Research Unit Seminar A.N.U., April, 1960.

26
CCC argued that the Commission should concentrate on vacant areas within existing urban development. In this particular case, the latter would have been more costly and complicated for the Commission but would have drawn on existing transport and other services. In the ensuing struggle the HC, supported by developers, succeeded in having the green belt land released against the recommendation of the CCC, the interests of transport authorities, and the needs of many of the residents of the development. Existing transport services were inadequate and the costs of creating new roads and public transport systems were considerable. In 1959 the new Minister for Local Government overruled the Plan, announcing the release of fifty square miles of green belt land. When added to two earlier instances where the Minister had simply 'suspended' the Plan, it became virtually meaningless. In the final instance it was the State Government's failure to support or reinforce the County Council's proposals in any formal or informal way that resulted in the Plan's loss of credibility.

While the reaction to the Minister's land release was surprisingly hostile, it was recognised that the CCC was characterised by intractible problems as a planning body. It was replaced in 1963 by a new single planning authority, having the "power to actively assist in the implementation of planning proposals."

STATE PLANNING AUTHORITY (SPA)

Original conceptions of the constitution of the SPA were modified after local government lobbying. To a predominantly technical and professional body were added five local government representatives. In addition to a full-time chairman and deputy chairman, the Authority consisted of 10 part-time members, five from local government, four public utility (DMR, Transport Dept., Local Govt. Dept., MWSDB) and one professional representative. Specific tasks of the authority included the co-ordination of plans for the use and development of land, carrying out research and advising the Minister, and advising councils on the principles and implementation of planning. The report recommending the establishment
of the SPA did not, however, suggest precise guidelines about how the Authority was to achieve its task of co-ordination. It referred vaguely to discharging its responsibilities effectively overriding the specific interests, but maintaining the 'goodwill' of appropriate bodies.

The Sydney Region Outline Plan (SROP)

In 1967 the SPA published its Prelude to a Plan containing information important for future growth and outlining the Authority's understanding of its tasks. It has been noted that this understanding itself contains contradictions concerning future development objectives that remain unresolved\(^1\). The Sydney Region Outline Plan was produced in August 1968, not a statutory land use plan, but a statement of principles and objectives, essentially prescribing extensions to urban areas over a period of the next thirty years. It indicated broad areas of urbanisation assuming that half the projected population would be decentralised to locations outside the Sydney Region. The principles include linear growth corridors, a highway grid pattern, regional growth centres and full utilisation of existing communication and public utility systems.

Criticisms of the Plan itself have focused on the ambiguity of its recommendations. It favours both the retention of Sydney as Australia's 'greatest city' and the development of 'new cities' within already established suburbs\(^2\). A metropolitan plan, the SROP is not related to any State Plan, nor it has been suggested, does it distinguish between objectives and strategies or discuss implementable and alternative strategies. The Plan itself reveals a failing commitment to the 'principles' as outlined, and focuses on emphases predetermined by the preferences of particular authorities. Water and sewerage services are given the greatest roles

\(^1\) King, R. 1975, op. cit. p. 13-14.
in determining the location of new developments. Transportation proposals are significantly sparse, suggesting that the process of planning over-emphasised the importance of authorities like the Water Board who co-operated with the SPA, neglecting transport considerations because of the reluctance or incapacity of the DMR to provide appropriate information and expenditure estimates\(^{(1)}\).

The Green Belt is rejected in the plan because of the authorities servicing difficulties, at the expense of the potential residential environment. Stretton maintains "... the 1968 Outline Plan and the State's land policies contained a large increase in segregation with plenty of rich profit even from the poorest land"\(^{(2)}\). The Plan accepts the continuation of existing land-use patterns according to which areas like Campbelltown and Green Valley continue to house lower-income earners, with few accompanying plans for feasible tertiary institutions (none at all for 50 sq. miles west from Parramatta to Penrith). It does nothing to counteract the trend for the segregation of lower income earners in outlying Western suburbs\(^{(3)}\).

Apart from internal inconsistencies and a planning technique with significant unacknowledged redistributive implications, the major difficulties encountered by the Plan related to its implementation. A substantial amount of actual planning and project development was to be undertaken by local councils who would then submit proposals to the Authority. Some criticism has been directed at this aspect of the Plan, both because it gives little indication as to how planning should be implemented at a local level, and because of the absence of skilled staff in councils to work on planning programs. The success of the Plan depended largely on sufficient support from the State Government and appropriate ministers. Only the Minister could intervene in particular cases or areas to suspend a scheme or demand a report. The SPA could be criticised for not having fully recognised its executive powerlessness and the necessity of Ministerial support.

\(^{(2)}\) Stretton, H. op. cit. p. 261.
\(^{(3)}\) Sandercock, L. op. cit. p. 188.
In reviews of the Plan it made no basic alterations despite the failure of the Government to make a strong commitment to support original guidelines. Critics of the Plan including the Institute of Architects and President of the Real Estate Institute made strong statements about the lack of governmental support for the SPA and the need for the latter to have more effective power. Harrison has suggested that "the plans are of considerably less importance than the flexibility of those who have the final responsibility for their administration. The process of metropolitan development is still the result of a multiplicity of individual development decisions"(1). Opposition to the Plan by State and local authorities has also been emphasised as a crucial contribution to its undermining in implementation(2).

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COMMISSION (PEC)

In 1973 the Healey Report on the N.S.W. planning structure was presented to the Government. Although it was not made public, the feeling expressed in the Report was that the SPA had created many hostilities, was administratively incompetent and had become too remote from the Minister. Members of the Healey Committee attributed the Authority's ineffectiveness to its size and exhibited tendency to lose touch with Cabinet priorities. The 1974 Act replaced the SPA with the PEC, a smaller body of eight commissioners more amenable to Ministerial control. As part of the attempt to increase this control, the PEC was a strong move away from local government and State Department representation. The Commission was to report on organisational and legislative changes that would integrate and co-ordinate the planning of land-use. Added to the functions of the SPA it was to prepare advice for the Minister for a new planning system. While the need for co-ordination was once again established as of primary importance, the PEC

(1) Harrison, P. 1972, op. cit. p. 98.
(2) Colman, J. op. cit. p. 8.
had no more powers than the SPA. It relies solely on the relevant authorities and organisations recognising the need to conform to planning authorities, and the need to exchange information with the Commission.

In November 1974, the new Ministry for Planning and Environment published its first report, "Towards a New Planning System for New South Wales", known as the "The Green Book". It suggested that a large proportion of the responsibility for planning should be transferred from the PEC to regional bodies. The Green Book was tentative about the implications for local councils but stressed that successful decentralised planning would depend largely on local council co-operation. The executive power of these regional authorities would be limited to statutory planning within guidelines established at the State level. However, in conception these authorities had considerable potential and were to some extent perceived as rivals by State Departments. Harrison has suggested that it was the perceived threat of these bodies to state authorities that produced a "watering-down" of ideas in the following Report "Proposals for a New Environmental Planning System for NSW" in June, 1975 (The Blue Book)\(^{(1)}\).

As an outline of the planning process "The Blue Book" focuses almost entirely on the organisational structure of planning. A strongly hierarchial planning structure and administration is suggested. At the State level the PEC will co-ordinate State policies and activities. Regional advisory councils, comprising council and citizen representation will cooperate with the PEC in producing regional plans, and at the local level, councils will make development decisions and carry out the planning process within regional guidelines. While the proposals include an emphasis on regional organisation, regional development authorities would only be established in those areas where more

\(^{(1)}\) Harrison, P. Regions and Parishes or How the Green Book Turned Blue Paper delivered at Conference on The Proposals for an Environmental Planning System for New South Wales, Uni. of Sydney, August 1975, p. 2.
than half the local councils are agreed, and regional authorities themselves would have more local government representation than suggested in "The Green Book". Apart from assuming substantial responsibility for planning, local councils would be given the task of administering development control within a land use plan formulated broadly by the PEC. Variations, suspensions and development orders are all part of these responsibilities.

The success of this planning structure is explicitly held to depend on the State Government's willingness to bind all government agencies and councils to planning objectives. Past experience suggests that this might not be forthcoming. Numerous doubts about the effectiveness of the recommendations to encourage multi-level planning have been voiced. In the past, local government has expressed little support for the concept of regional planning and the Local Government Association has verbalised its opposition to local council involvement in regional organisation. The regional authorities would comprise representatives from local councils with differing, and often antagonistic interests. The powers of the PEC itself in both the formulation and enforcement of plans are restricted. Its supervision is largely of regional plans, which depend on considerable local level specification for realisation. Further, disciplinary power over councils still resides only with the Minister, who has, in the past taken little account of PEC advice.

Apart from the guidelines concerned with the machinery of planning, there are few specific guidelines about what constitutes an effective planning process and associated techniques, at regional or local levels. Some mention is made of participation and possible techniques of representation, but other factors such as relevant time scales and the weighting of environmental, economic and social factors are not explicitly considered. It would seem unlikely that councils, for example, would attempt to clarify the guidelines, without any positive incentive to do so, and without

(1) ibid. p. 7.
any enforcement not to do otherwise. The Report's focus on formal process and chains of responsibility leaves many problems unresolved and highlights the difficulty of achieving effective integration without a more comprehensive understanding of institutional features.

COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND PASSENGER TRANSPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (CUMTAC)

CUMTAC was set up in 1965 to advise the Minister for Transport, at that stage only responsible for public transport, on matters referred to it, such as how bus and rail passenger transfer could be improved, and proposals regarding land-use, staggering of hours and co-ordination of services. It comprised representatives from the Railways, Motor Transport, Government Transport and Main Roads authorities, and the SPA, and Treasury. CUMTAC received advice from a technical sub-committee consisting of officers from member authorities, and discussed the transport implications of major projects. These did not include roads and traffic since these were the responsibility of the Minister for Local Government and Highways and were referred to the Traffic Advisory Committee.

Sydney Area Transportation Study (SATS)

CUMTAC was asked to comment on the transport implications of the SROP, with the result that it commissioned and supervised the Sydney Area Transportation Study. The study was given the task of determining transport needs, analysing alternatives and recommending transport systems, taking account of economic feasibility, environmental and social factors. It was also concerned with the development of analytical techniques for considering the consequences of alternative plans.

SATS has been the subject of a barrage of criticisms. A comprehensive critique is not attempted here, however, like a number of other planning studies undertaken in Australia in the past,
SATS produced plans of a financial scale which has little hope of being achieved. A number of the more modest transport programmes recommended by SATS are useful contributions, but the overall plan is unlikely to ever be adopted because of an excessive concentration on inflexible and highly capital intensive solutions. While some of these type of solutions may have to be adopted in Sydney, increasingly, smaller scale plans with shorter time horizons are seen as being more feasible and desirable solutions to many urban transport problems.

CUMTAC has also encountered difficulties in achieving co-ordination amongst a number of authorities. When a re-evaluation of the role of Mascot Airport was initiated in 1968, CUMTAC attempted to reconcile the solutions being offered by the Department of Civil Aviation, to cope with increased air traffic, with other existing and potential transport services. After consultation with the relevant authorities it suggested a railway system, but failed to secure the support from other authorities for this proposal. The basic problem was the same as that encountered by other planning bodies, an absence of Federal and State Governmental support in securing the co-operation of authorities. However, CUMTAC's continual demand for information and representations from various government authorities, did produce a broader comprehension of the problem and some degree of shared sensitivity to the need for planning. The impact of CUMTAC proposals, with support from various other planning committees, was contingent on the support or otherwise of the Minister, and his relationship with other Ministers with related portfolios, such as Local Government and Highways. CUMTAC's record of winning this support for its recommendations was relatively good, although a good deal obviously depended on the interests of the particular Minister and his closest advisors.

URBAN TRANSPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (URTAC)

URTAC was set up in 1973 to replace CUMTAC, also under the Minister of Transport and without statutory powers. One of the reasons for
its reconstituted structure was the Australian Government's new interest in urban transport matters and its receptivity to urban planning proposals from the States. URTAC is responsible for co-ordination, especially within land-use planning proposals, and for maximising the efficient use of existing transport modes. The Under-Secretary of Transport has recently replaced the Chief Commissioner of the PTC as Chairman of URTAC and other members come from the PTC, DMR, PEC, DMT, Police Department, Maritime Services Board and Treasury. The technical staff of URTAC is the Urban Transport Study Group (UTS), the successor of SATS, reporting directly to URTAC. In parallel with the establishment of URTAC and following the Machinery of Government Review of 1974-75, the Ministry of Transport and Highways was partially reorganised. This involved the addition of a Development Co-ordination Division and more recently a formal Policy Analysis Section.

In February, 1976 URTAC submitted a major Report to the Ministers for Transport and Highways, and Planning and Environment. Recommendations prompted by the Committee's problems of co-ordination and fragmentation of authority (e.g. a traffic co-ordinating committee) are included amongst other policy recommendation concerning public transport, traffic management, roads, land use, transport corridors and inner city industrial areas.

The Report adopts what appears to be a rather courageous move away from the capital intensive freeway programme recommendations of earlier studies. Its new emphases, however, do have a pragmatic basis and reflect the increasingly financially constrained work programs being adopted by departments. It recognises the considerable scope for improvement using the existing transport system opting for improvement and full utilisation of existing services rather than the initiation of new projects, the deferral or cancellation of particularly expensive projects and a strong emphasis in funding and attention on public transport.

The overall transport strategy outlined adopts a progressive view of meeting transport needs. The Report recommends:
(a) The development of cross-regional routes along which fixed
rail public transport is unlikely to be available;

(b) The development of routes redirecting traffic growth from
the CBD to major regional centres;

(c) Development of arterial roads to bypass regional centres;

(d) Diversification of public transport away from CBD orient-
ation;

(e) Capitalising on the latent capacity of the public transport
system.

It also confirms the need for a traffic authority co-ordinating
committee with responsibility for all traffic bodies and an
emphasis on concepts bearing on demand, such as staggered hours
and bus priority lanes as well as capacity.

The planning techniques espoused by URTAC support this strategy.
They include firstly, programmes with short-term benefits, a
focus on existing rather than projected needs and short-term
solutions to problems given existing levels of financing. There
is a strong recommendation for co-operation with the Federal
Government, particularly in public transport areas. A second,
complementary set of techniques concentrate on longer-term land
use/transport facility strategies. The creation of regional
centres and their self-contained development, and the evolution
of multi-faceted solutions to areas with particular problems,
are two examples of these planning approaches.

From an institutional perspective it is significant that the
URTAC report appears to escape the traditional dominance of
preconceived DMR programmes. Compared with SATS there is a
significant shift in the ordering of priorities. URTAC switched
top priority from extension of the Warringah Freeway to the
Chullora-Kyeemagh county road. Despite their differing scales
the URTAC Report shows a greater comprehension of the land use/transport dynamic. Further, a recent communication from the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Transport and Highways notes that "the URTAC Report was formally endorsed by the previous State Government in February 1976 and has been substantially accepted by the present Government".

It is significant, however, that despite its stated strategies, URTAC makes few recommendations which reflect a co-ordinated effort between transport modes. In the report, sections on public transport and roads are relatively self-contained and suggest that the PTC and DMR were still developing autonomously their recommendations for future development. Altered emphases are evidence less of an attempt to define problems and consider solutions in a comprehensive way, than a perception of revised policy directives and preferences. The guidelines for future transport developments indicate that URTAC's role in planning is restricted to combining separate work programs in a single document and discussing general planning directions.

OTHER BODIES

In the past some of the work related to the efforts of a number of authorities has been directed by Interdepartmental Committees (IDC's). These committees, mainly concerned with co-ordination have included Parking Advisory Committees, Traffic Advisory Committee, Height of Buildings Advisory Committee, (HOBAC). Recently a new Traffic Authority with permanent staff has taken over a lot of IDC work, having powers over parking and motor traffic control. While these bodies are clearly a significant device for encouraging communications between departments and authorities, their concern is typically confined to a narrow sphere of activity and their role in planning is restricted. The PEC but not URTAC has had formal representation on these committees, although obviously certain bodies are represented on both, such as the Ministry of Transport.
Council Bodies

The Sydney City Council and local councils have had statutory land planning powers since 1945. The Cumberland County Council was set up to provide a framework for local council planning schemes and to effect a degree of co-ordination on the actions of public authorities and private developers. Councils have been formally responsible for financing the running costs of the CCC and SPA. This financial burden has created the basis for considerable hostility between councils and planning bodies, and jeopardised the effectiveness of guidelines laid down by planning bodies given the lack of formal constraints for adherence to them by councils. Under the SPA and PEC, Councils retain wide discretionary powers for most development applications. The Minister has the power to suspend statutory planning schemes and has often exercised this power at the recommendation of a council (1).

SYDNEY CITY COUNCIL

During the 1950's Sydney experienced a property and redevelopment boom. The Labour-dominated City Council at this time was responsible for a substantial inner urban residential area, but it's energies were directed towards providing welfare facilities to inner urban residents, rather than controlling the operation of private developers (2). When, in 1965, the Liberal Party won the State Election, the boundaries of the City Council were redrawn, and the conservative Civic Reform Association gained control of the Council. The effective interests represented and manifested in future council activities, were those of professionals oriented towards finance, insurance and property industries. The City of Sydney Strategic Plan was released by the Council in 1971. Despite a nominal commitment to public participation, conservation and improvements to the quality of life, the Strategic Plan favoured expansion of office blocks rather than recreational

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(1) Harrison, P. 1972, p. 97.
(2) Sandercock, L. op. cit. p. 196.
or other facilities\(^{(1)}\). In-built subsidies, substantial land
tax concessions and rebates, and the floor-space ratio restrictions
implemented in the 1971 Plan have encouraged intensive development
of the city area\(^{(2)}\). Opposition to that Plan emanated from three
sources; the ALP, local resident action groups and professional
architects and planners. An indication of the impact of their
opposition was the Council's approval of the Weclooomooloo
Redevelopment Project in 1972. This Project reaffirmed the
Council's existing policy, one of encouraging high density develop-
ment with little systematic consideration of its implications on
low-income residents being displaced to outer urban areas by the
more affluent moving inwards, or on public authorities required to
meet the costs imposed by private sector development.

The second Plan in the City Council's three yearly cycle of
strategic planning and action, 1974-77 City of Sydney Strategic
Plan, explicitly recognises this opposition. The Review committee,
consisting of three aldermen and representatives from the SPA
and Ministries of Local Government and Transport, stipulate four
long-term objectives. The first and most important for the
purposes of this report, is the unification and simplification
of the city's management. Proposals for the achievement of this
objective include encouraging information exchange through
participatory exercises such as public meetings and discussions,
and through encouraging existing council use of the town hall
as the venue for committee meetings and the focus of activity.
The Plan also advocates legislation and a review of financial
arrangements to enhance the role of the Sydney City Council as
the planner and controller of city development, and the amal-
gamation of advisory committees into the City Council.

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(1) Ibid, p. 199.
(2) Bavallion, M. "Urban Problems, Public Policies and Social
Savage, E.J. "Some Effects on Floor Space Ratio and Bonus
Regulations on Rates of Return: A Case Study for Sydney
Other objectives outlined by the Review Committee are largely dependent for their success on the achievement of the management objective. They include 'Accessibility', 'Diversity' and 'Environment'. The proposals relating to these objectives can be critically scrutinised on two grounds. Firstly, some appear to be potentially contradictory, for example a commitment to increasing public transport and pedestrian malls in the inner city is accompanied by a commitment to large-scale fringe parking areas in what are clearly inner city (though not CBD) areas. Secondly, the Plan advocates emphasising commercial, residential, learning and leisure uses in future development. This includes the encouragement of Government and government subsidised housing for low-income earners in inner city areas, for example, Woolloomooloo, to ensure that the proposed new diversity of city services benefits a diversity of users. The Plan can be commended for its breadth of scope, but many of these proposals appear to be flimsily based on the assumption of the co-operation of other authorities.

Criticisms of the effectiveness of the Sydney City Council have focused on its operation as well as the implications of its Plans. The Council is viewed as allowing, if not encouraging, uncontrolled development of the CBD by private developers at the expense of the interests of other groups. In the period from 1961 to 1971 the city of Sydney and inner urban municipalities, including South Sydney, Leichhardt, Botany, Wollahra, Waverley and North Sydney experienced substantial reductions in residential populations and manufacturing activity, and corresponding increased opportunities for white-collar employment in commercial, finance, property and service activities. This concentration of white-collar employment opportunities in the City of Sydney and accompanying residential shift of these employees to inner urban areas and manufacturing employees to outer areas such as Campbelltown and Baulkham Hills has increased pressures on roads servicing the city area. Authorities responsible for road construction and maintenance have faced pressures and lower-income earning residents have been forced by rising land values and development pressures to outer areas often with poor local services and
accessibility to employment opportunities. In its reinforcement of these trends the City Council and its Plan have encouraged transport pressures of a particular kind and aggravated existing residential segregation and the inequalities arising from it\(^{(1)}\). However, even if the Council had resisted internal pressures to encourage high density development in the CBD, and restricted the operations of speculating property owners and developers, it is unlikely that other authorities would have responded with relevant restrictions and changes to their policy.

**LOCAL COUNCILS**

Formally local councils are responsible for the administration of the Local Government and other Acts. This includes the construction and maintenance of local roads, the provision of parks and recreation facilities, collection of rubbish and a number of administrative and welfare services. Their major revenue source are rates on the unimproved value of land within the municipality although they do receive grants and can apply for loans.

Diverse interpretations exist of the influence on urban development of local authorities when compared to that of state authorities\(^{(2)}\). However, in a number of ways particular local councils substantially influence the distribution and accessibility of local services, for example libraries, shopping centres and recreation facilities. They also have considerable scope in the way they interpret their responsibilities to influence the allocation of resources amongst residents. For example, councils have the power to instruct developers to provide streets and parks in new subdivisions. Alternatively these costs may be met through rates or increasing land prices. Also in the administration of development regulations they exercise a substantial influence on the nature and location of development and its effects on surrounding residents.


There are a number of ways in which local councils actively and inadvertently influence the distribution of services within their own municipality and across a broader metropolitan area.

(i) Local Government is set up in such a way that different municipalities have vastly different revenue bases. Often the poorest municipalities are characterised by the most inadequate local services.

(ii) Rating procedures often mean lower-income earners pay higher rates both in terms of income and absolute figures.

(iii) Local councils differ in the staff and other resources they possess to implement plans and provide services effectively.

(iv) Council interests do not coincide with all groups present in the community. Some councils attempt to represent the interests of less privileged groups while others actively support the interests of developers and speculators. Thus the amount of deliberate redistribution of local resources, if any, undertaken by councils varies between municipalities.

(v) The extent of corruption and abuse of planning schemes within councils has varied but has in some cases fostered the interests of certain groups.

(vi) Local councils tend to be parochial, rarely interpreting their interests as coinciding with broader metropolitan objectives, even if the latter would benefit a large proportion of residents.

The brief discussion of these factors in the Sydney context that follows indicate the way inequities in service provision are created and exacerbated because councils are unwilling or ill-equipped to recognise their role in the planning of local service provision and the importance of the integration of their efforts with those of other authorities.

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The Sydney Statistical Division contained forty local government areas (LGA's) in 1969 with large differences in area, population, predominant activities and the average income and wealth of residents. Each of these factors and the recency of development determine the municipality's tax base and its ability to provide local services. The combination of factors creating a poor municipality characterise areas already experiencing a poor standard of service. The organisation and financing of local government therefore tends to exaggerate rather than counteract inequalities in the level of existing services.

The equity implications of these differences in LGA's are emphasised by rating procedures. In his analysis of the rates paid by those residing in different areas of Sydney, Manning notes that the relatively poor tend to live in municipalities charging a higher rate. Lower-income earners pay much more of their income in rates than higher income owners. They also on average pay higher rates because their properties are located in municipalities levying high rates. The financial independence of councils allows those with a poor tax base (a low unimproved value on rateable land) to charge higher rates in order to achieve the same level of revenue per head as councils where the unimproved value is higher. Manning found that rates tend to be highest in areas of low prosperity experiencing a fast rate of growth (1).

By far the greatest proportion of expenditure within municipalities is on the provision and maintenance of roads and streets, with the primary beneficiaries being road users. Councils spend very little on potentially redistributive services to the young or elderly such as kindergartens or senior citizens centres. In a comparison of local services between municipalities it emerged that less prosperous but particularly outer municipalities such as Sutherland experience less frequent rubbish collection, fewer

hectares of parkland, and fewer kindergartens than more prosperous areas such as Kur-ring-ai. Poorer outer areas do have reasonable accessibility to swimming pools and libraries(1).

Manning suggests in his analysis that in the provision of services such as kindergartens, the activity of local councils in organising self-help or voluntary groups is of primary importance. In some poorer areas this sort of activity by progressive councils has counteracted inadequacies in services due to lack of funds(2). Thus the quality of local government representatives, their officers, and the way they interpret and attempt to meet local needs is an important determinant of the services provided. A number of councils have found that it is in their particular interests, as distinct from those of the loosely defined 'community', to provide planning consents contrary to the provisions of the local planning scheme. The abuse of these schemes has in the past, been associated with inequitable distribution of access to, and utilisation of, local facilities(3).

While local government exercises a substantial degree of influence over urban development, reconciling or co-ordinating local council efforts is, for a number of reasons, particularly difficult. Under the supervision of the Cumberland County Council, local councils were given the responsibility of formulating local planning schemes. Only three out of forty-two responded, indicating the preferences of local governments to respond to development proposals with a high degree of flexibility and discretion. The preoccupation of Councils with specific 'local interests' has been consistently demonstrated(4). In the case of the Cumberland

(1) ibid, pp 34-55.
(2) ibid, p. 54.
(3) Sandercock, L. op. cit. p. 202 has documented cases of significant abuse of planning schemes in Liverpool, (1953, 1963) Bankstown (1963), North Sydney (1969) Leichhardt (1953) and Randwick (1973), amongst others. Also the Liverpool Council was recently dismissed on the same charge. (Reported in 'The Age; 1-4-76. p. 5).
County Council, despite a majority of local government representation, its effectiveness was inhibited by a fundamental lack of local council co-operation\(^{(1)}\). The formulation and management of metropolitan or wider-based planning schemes made difficult by the presence of strong local interests has been exacerbated by the existence of different perceptions between councils of 'local interests'. In some upper-class areas councils espouse anti-progress, residential amenity values whereas in working-class areas are characteristically more disposed to industry, and the encouragement of local employment. Wealthier residents are usually more aware of, and adept at ensuring the protection of 'quality of life' interests\(^{(2)}\). Metropolitan plans rarely take account of these differing perceptions or council capacities to defend them.

The inadequacy of communication and co-operation between council bodies and state instrumentalities has been noted by a number of commentators\(^{(3)}\). It has numerous implications for metropolitan planning - areas of responsibility are often unclear, facilitating conflict and wasteful duplication of functions. Distorted and incomplete chains of accountability preclude the effective monitoring of decisions and actions taken by authorities at a State and local level. For example, in the case of Blacktown Council, enormous growth created pressures for transport development that could not be financed by the Council in conjunction with authorities. A lack of communication in the early stages of development created serious problems which were then inherited by the Council, but which it could do little to remedy effectively. The unclear division of responsibilities in this case precluded achieving goals though co-ordination of the activities of a number of levels of government.

THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER GROUPS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT

\(^{(1)}\) Harrison, P. 1975, op. cit. p. 71.


Other significant actors in the process of urban development fall into three groups. In each case generalizations about these groups are more difficult than governmental bodies. There has been a marked lack of research conducted in this area, largely due to the indirect rather than formalised way in which these groups participate in the decision-making process. As a result, their influence has often been underestimated because of the difficulties of precise specification. While these groups may be least susceptible to external control or influence, the concern here is with existing decision-making arrangements. Without some knowledge of how they operate independently and in interaction with other significant bodies, a highly distorted view of the overall decision-making process emerges. The groups discussed include private property owners and developers, resident groups and unions.

Speculators and Developers

A recurring theme in the case studies so far has been the assessment of the effects on groups disadvantaged by existing decision-making arrangements. In contrast, speculators and developers have been isolated as benefiting as a result of the nature of the existing planning process, and as a result of the direct exercise of economic, political and other forms of influence. Apps has suggested that owners and developers benefit from decisions taken by public authorities for example, to develop certain areas, because of the profit on unearned income they gain as a direct result of a public policy decision.

The existing decision-making arrangements positively assist this group externalise their costs, for example by influencing the location of public investments and projects, at the expense of those required to bear those costs through taxes and rates.

(1) Apps, P. and Ravallion, M. 'The Political and Economic Framework of City Development and Change' Paper delivered at the Planning Research Centre in the City of Sydney Conference, University of Sydney, November, 1975.
Neutze has conducted a detailed study of the private sector and their attitudes to planning. Speculators are divided into those who are specifically "well-informed", and into those with cheap finance readily available, and he argues that only the former are "basically opposed to effective and precise planning"(1). In contrast, are "cheap finance speculators" and land developers who benefit from the minimisation of future uncertainties created by planning. Neutze assumes these developers are plagued by fears that something irrevocable will cause a fall in the value of land-holdings, and that they are completely powerless and without recourse in the event of unanticipated initiatives in land-use. The following examples appear to demonstrate to the contrary, that even 'cheap finance speculators' and developers are rarely such pawns in the process of existing decision-making.

The influence of property developers has characteristically been manifested through pressures on State and Local Governments to resist or ignore the proposals of planning bodies and planning schemes. One example of this was the pressure exerted by developers in North Sydney which, unchecked, created a substantial strain on local transport and parking facilities and congestion in local streets. In spite of appeals to the North-Sydney Council, the Ministers of Transport and Local Government and the State Planning Authority, by CUMTAC the Police Traffic Branch and resident groups, development continued and attempts to restrict the floor space ratio were undermined. It was not until 1971, when a new council opposed to intensive development was elected, and CUMTAC's appeals began to be recognised, was the process of development slowed down. In this example as a result of the pressures of developers, the transport implications of development were ignored creating considerable difficulties in the area for transport authorities, and general congestion and poor access for residents. In another example, central city area developers and property owners succeeded in opposing the SPA and its attempts to limit the density of city buildings.

(1) Neutze, G., op. cit. pp 8-11.
Two organised groups of property owners and developers, the Pitt Street Property Owners Defence League and the Institute of Real Estate Developers have succeeded in opposing the recommendations of planning bodies, if not the bodies themselves. Other bodies, such as the Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority (SCRA) have acted as agents or facilitators of private development. Intensive development has often occurred in areas assessed by planning bodies to be unsuited to it because of the influence of these groups. Their appeals to councils, senior bureaucrats and ministers have created a climate in which it is impossible for planning bodies to exercise an effective control over the location of developments.

Resident Action Groups (RAGS)

During the 1960's a number of locally based associations of residents were set up, explicitly to object to certain development (particularly road) proposals. The first of these in Sydney was the Paddington Society, established in 1964 and whose membership comprised the first wave of the middle-class moving into inner urban areas. This was followed by the Glebe Society in 1968. The purposes of these groups were respectively, to oppose the widening of Jersey Road and the construction of the North-Western expressway, which in both cases would have severely disrupted communities and precipitated the demolition of valued buildings.

By 1971 several more politically-orientated resident groups with broader and more lasting bases of concern, were beginning to have some influence on issues relating to freeways, inner-urban high rise and flat development. In 1971 the Coalition of Resident Action Groups (CRAG) was formed consisting of an inner core of nine resident action groups. It has since grown considerably, but its record of achievements is limited. As an 'umbrella' group, CRAG has espoused certain shared objections to expressways in general, but it has been particular groups who have organised the most effective opposition and undertaken systematic studies of alternatives to development proposals.
Interpretations of the extent and quality of the impact of resident action groups (RAGS) have differed. Following the well-organised protests of the Paddington Society to the widening of Jersey Road, an enquiry was commissioned by the State Government and it accepted the resulting recommendations, namely to abandon the proposals and establish a new zoning for restricting development, "special architectural interest". However there now appears to be some doubt as to whether this opposition has been upheld. Sandercock has suggested that the enquiry's recommendations have been "shelved" by the DMR, taking this as evidence of the Action Group's fairly superficial and easily placated opposition(1). The Glebe Society, in pressing for the North-Western freeway to be located underground, recommended alternatives to existing plans(2). Also, the Mt Druitt Action Committee and Australian Transport Study Group in the Blacktown area, succeeded in not only criticising existing road facilities but also facilitating improvements.

The activities of other resident groups oriented towards opposing local government planning and development controls through political representation on local councils is less readily evaluated. Active lobbying was clearly evident in the 1968 local elections in Mosman, Hunters Hill and Sutherland, in 1971 in Leichhardt; Woollahra, Warringah, Canterbury and Mosman, and in some councils again in 1974(1). Typically, in areas like Paddington with strong middle-class professional groups, the interests of the latter have gained increasing representation on local councils. In other municipalities the interests of particular groups of residents are not defended so articulately or effectively. Communities with less expertise and resources available have reverted to more radical forms of protest over specific issues, as in the Rocks and Woolloomooloo areas, or have not mobilised their opposition to local government activity at all. To this extent concerted or

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(1) Sandercock, L. op. cit. p. 206.
prolonged pressure by resident action groups to introduce reform through a variety of means has been largely restricted to areas with residents already possessing a basic potential to influence.

Unions

Resident groups have generally encountered unreceptive local councils in their attempts to oppose certain developments. The basis for an alliance with unionists was established in June 1971, when a resident group, "The Battlers for Kelly's Bush" sought the assistance of unions in preserving twelve acres of natural bush in the suburb of Hunters Hill. The support of the Federated Engine Drivers and Fireman's Association and the Builders Labourers Federation ensured that no bush would be cleared and in spite of planning permission already given by the Council, no housing development occurred.

Since 1971 more than fifty development projects planned in Sydney have been held up by 'green bans'. By 1973 projects worth $3,000 million had been halted. Most of the bans applied up to August, 1972 had been geared towards the preservation of open space and historic buildings; later bans focused on larger scale schemes involving considerable financial investment, for example, planned expressway development. A standard procedure for union intervention has subsequently evolved. Unions often respond by imposing a ban as a result of a public meeting requesting their intervention.

The Builders Labourers Federation previously led by Jack Mundey, has been the major force behind union 'green bans' in a number of areas. Mundey himself has been a crucial interpreter between union politics and an ideology stressing quality of life; the importance of resisting resource consumption, pollution, and the widespread exploitation of social resources by entrepreneurs for personal motives. The bans have represented a strong coincidence

(1) Sandercock, L. op. cit. p. 208.
(2) Camina, M. op. cit.
of interest for the unions. Their concern is with protection of the environment and the life styles of disadvantaged groups, and the subjects of their opposition are the private developers and entrepreneurs with interests antagonistic to those of workers. While the political thrust underlying union 'green bans' has prompted considerable criticism from observers with both conservative and radical orientations, it has been pointed out that the political nature of green ban action does not, necessarily, make the argument that they propose invalid\(^{(1)}\).

The pattern of values and interests that are significant inputs to development decisions has altered. Considerable weight has been added to the typically under-represented voice of the environment, and particularly the environment of the working-class. Developers and government authorities have been forced to consider a powerful new perspective in their development decisions. It is significant that many of the resident groups which unions have supported have consisted of lower-income earners who have been long-time residents in an area (especially Woolloomooloo and the Rocks), and who would have been unable to withstand pressures for development without the assistance of sympathetic professionals (e.g. Rocks RAG drawing up a 'People's Plans for the Rocks' which has become a working basis for future plans), and the crucial support of the unions. Green bans have not only provoked greater public awareness of environmental and social issues but have stimulated awareness of the distributive implications of existing development decisions.

Predictably the role of the BLF has been a hard one to maintain. The 'environmental' or 'quality of life' cause has few simple rewards especially for the rank and file membership of the union. A lack of conviction amongst the membership has meant that at times when 'scab' labour has been used on banned projects, considerable opposition has emerged from within unions. Evidence of this, combined with leadership challenges and deregistration of

\(^{(1)}\) ibid.
the NSW BLF from the Federal BLF, have considerably weakened the strength of the unions' bargaining power. Organised opposition to green ban action by the Master Builders Association, supported by the State Government, have undermined the position of the union further in recent years (1). However, the new leadership of the BLF has reaffirmed 'green ban' policy, and in spite of the unions' deregistration, considerable public and professional (e.g. Royal Aust. Institute of Architects) support, suggest that union bans will continue to provide significant qualifications and restrictions to urban development.

Whether it is desirable that such action continue to perform this function is arguable. Ideally the process of planning should be sufficiently well tuned to community values to avoid provoking such extreme measures. It is neither in the interests of developers, authorities, residents nor unions to become involved in such intractible conflict. A revised planning approach should attempt to minimise rather than exacerbate areas where interests conflict. Equally some credible planning mechanism is needed to take over once a 'green ban' has identified opposition to a proposal, to provide for all interested parties to be consulted and for a decision to be reached that can expect a reasonable level of community acceptance.

(1) Sandercock, L. op. cit. p. 209.
CHAPTER 3 - OVERVIEW OF EXISTING PLANNING

ABSTRACT:
Typically, discussions of Sydney planning have focused either on the content of plans or the relationships between agencies in plan implementation, as the basic source of planning problems. This chapter in contrast argues for a broader framework for evaluation. The political administrative environment of planning and the extent and form of co-ordination has significant impact not only on the way plans are related to each other, but also the way problems are defined, alternative solutions are considered and consequently the way sets of consumer interests are represented. The analysis of existing planning is directed towards clarification of existing decision-making and power-sharing arrangements. Identified through this analysis are institutional and other changes that encourage greater scrutiny of decisions and greater acceptance of responsibility for them. Formal decision making structures, one reflection of the institutional environment, emerge as not conducive to integrated planning. Features of informal inter-organisational relationships indicate that the interests of various users of transport services are not systematically represented in the planning environment. The processes of planning in which operating and construction authorities, planning bodies, councils and other groups are involved, have implications that benefit particular groups of consumers, but neglect or impose disproportionate costs on already disadvantaged sections of the community.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the second chapter of this report was to build up a picture of the existing processes of planning in Sydney. It has been argued that only through a thorough knowledge of the process, its effects and the associated problems of existing planning, can meaningful recommendations for improvement be made.
Revealed in descriptions of Sydney planning are a diversity of notions about the basis of planning problems and consequently the nature of any solution. Some observers focus on the planning techniques used by authorities. They attribute problems to inadequate consideration of certain factors, particularly social and environmental or inaccurate assessments of them. Other commentators focus on internal organisational structure. They maintain either the formal responsibilities of authorities are too narrowly defined, or organisational objectives are not clearly stated and not related to particular strategies for their achievement. Some see the problem with planning in the planning authority's lack of strong formal powers, while others emphasise the inadequacy of organisational links, the lack of discussion and absence of 'open planning' between authorities. Planning problems have generally been conceptualised as arising from either the content of plans or interrelations between them. Solutions to these problems have tended to be separately defined. Improved content of plans has been seen as a 'technical' problem resolved largely by planners scrutinising and improving their techniques. Improved relations between agencies has tended to be seen as a problem of coordination, but co-ordination often defined in terms of communication.

In contrast, in this report, co-ordination\(^{(1)}\) is seen as inherently a policy laden process. It must be directed towards specific ends, either overtly or implicitly. Co-ordination is embodied as part of planning because it not only influences the way a proposal is implemented, but also the way problems are defined, solutions are generated and evaluated, decisions are made and monitored. Numerous political and administrative factors influence both the content of, and relationships between, plans. An institutional constraint may affect the way plans are interrelated, and, in turn effect the way a problem is defined. Agencies in Sydney act in a constrained political environment. The content of the plans which they produce has a tendency to

\(^{(1)}\) A more explicit elaboration of this concept may be found in Chapter 4, where three types of co-ordination are discussed.
reflect that environment. The conclusions which follow attempt to assess existing planning in an encompassing way, relating the plans and proposals produced to the institutional environment in which they are developed.

The conclusions reached in this chapter clearly raise significant questions about existing and desirable divisions of power and responsibility between authorities, planning bodies and their political masters. In Chapter Four some desirable changes in institutional relationships are suggested. However, it is important at this point to clarify a number of general assumptions. Ideally all decisions should be made by elected political representatives, however inevitably many important decisions are made by officers within authorities who are not directly accountable. It is argued in this report that any changes in institutional arrangements should illuminate rather than conceal decision-makers and power-holders, and increase their responsibility and accountability by providing more opportunities for scrutiny. Where possible decisions which have significant ramifications should be transferred from authorities possessing an unwarranted level of influence to political decision-makers.

All authorities should be in a competitive position to earn Ministerial support. If an authority is deprived of expertise, funds and other resources, it is unlikely to produce advice of a quality that deserves political endorsement. The remedy for a weak and ineffective authority may be an increase in independent status, a close system of checks on the operation of other authorities, a centralisation or decentralisation of activities oriented toward certain objectives. The appropriate changes to any organisation's political administrative environment should be based on careful analysis of the nature of existing decision-making arrangements. The recommendations in Chapter Four are based on such an analyses.

The following conclusions are presented in two forms. Firstly, a diagramatic representation of formal and information inter-
organisational relationships is presented with annotated comments. Changes in formal cabinet and administrative structuring and the inter-organisational relationships achieved through formal representation mechanisms are discussed. The implications of these formal relationships particularly in relation to the environment in which stages of the planning process are carried out is noted. The reasons for attempting to document informal patterns of influence and co-operation, or the lack of it, between bodies is then discussed. Secondly, based on the cases in Chapter Two, brief conclusions about the planning environment of various bodies, their planning processes, and the kinds of effects these have on groups whose interests are represented and not represented are discussed.

THE EXISTING PLANNING ENVIRONMENT

Formal Decision-Making Structures

Major changes in State government organisation were announced in January, 1975. The Planning and Environment Minister became responsible for the State Planning and Environment Commission and State Pollution Control Commission. The Transport and Highways portfolio incorporated the Ministry of Transport, Public Transport Commission, Department of Motor Transport and State Road Authority (proposed name for the DMR). Five Cabinet Standing Committees were created, two of which were Natural Resources and Industrial Resources. While Transport and Highways were included with Public Works and Ports, Mines and Energy under the latter, Planning and Environment were subsumed under Natural Resources with Local Government and Tourism, Lands and Forests, Agriculture, and Decentralisation and Development.

The decision-making structure illustrated in Fig. 1 indicates that integrated planning is rendered difficult by Cabinet structuring. Proposals relating to public housing, water, sewerage, drainage and land uses are considered and recommended in a separate forum to those pertaining to transportation. Transport is categor-
Fig. 1: CABINET AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE.
ised as an industrial resource, implying that its objective of moving goods and people is not substantially defined and influenced by land-use and development decisions. Factors creating transport demand are dealt with under the separate committee responsible for social development.

Formal and Informal Inter-organisational Relationships

Intra and inter-organisation structures can be defined according to a number of criteria. The most commonly used and easily measured, is the structural pattern outlined by formal lines of responsibility and accountability. This conception of structure clearly has some deficiencies when sources of power and influence are being identified. Superimposed on, or often quite distinct from, formal chains of communication and responsibility, are informal relationships. The latter are typically difficult to define since they often depend on intangible sentiments and diffuse actions. In an inter-organisational context, the 'styles' of significant heads, the 'character' the organisation has built up over time, and the pattern and interaction of professional interests within the organisation are each important.

The inter-organisational interactions depicted in the following diagrams are based on the evidence and interpretation from various sources cited in the preceding case studies. They are therefore susceptible to the same criticisms as this Report as a whole, but can also be justified in the same terms. Further, they provide an interesting basis for comparison with diagrams depicting formal relationships; the fact that the two rarely equate reinforces the importance of attempting to depict existing informal relationships. The following diagrams suggest that the sequence and shape of urban development in Sydney are to a substantial extent determined by features of institutions and their alliances and antagonisms, that are not reflected in formal channels of communication and responsibility.
As well as being by definition not easily documented, the interrelationships portrayed in the following diagrams are difficult to identify because of administrative conventions. The paucity of links emanating from, and being directed to, public authorities is explained by the bureaucratic tradition of these government bodies being advisors, and administrators of political decisions. As such they are formally bound by the principles of secrecy and accountability within the civil service. Informal channels of power and influence are not documented, and rarely acknowledged. The same stance explains the difficulty of defining relationships between Ministers and public authorities. Whilst it is clear that some authorities take a strong policy 'line', and have enjoyed particularly receptive Ministers, it is difficult to document or rate these degrees of influence. Informal channels in these cases are highly significant but not obvious. The other reason for a body appearing to be located within a vacuum, is the difficulty of obtaining information and making generalisations about recently constituted bodies. The PEC for example, is not particularly autonomous, but there are insufficient precedents to suggest behavioural or attitudinal trends.

It is apparent that the diagrams obey no fixed time scale. Some of the bodies are successors but cannot be grouped together because they have had a varying impact on transport policy and other organisations. Case studies by which the position of the Cumberland County Council is gauged occurred several decades ago, whereas most of those relevant to government authorities, resident groups and unions occurred within the last decade. The diagrams are also obviously confined to that sphere of activity specifically concerned with transport and to some extent with urban development. A number of other bodies could have been considered (the Department of Motor Transport, Maritime Services Board, the Urban Transport Study Group), but were excluded both because of the scope of this report and because they were assessed to have less overall influence in the policy area. The bodies
included were those which emerged as particularly significant, or potentially significant actors in planning and execution of development, particular of transport services, in the Sydney Metropolitan area.

This kind of representation obviously demands generalisations be made about aggregate group and institution behaviour. A higher degree of consistency in the stances and actions of certain groups, for example local councils, is portrayed by the diagrams than is the case. While these generalisations do introduce distortions, they are a necessary step in defining an overview and also drawing conclusions.

Formal channels of representation depicted in Fig. 2 cover a continuous time frame. They suggest that overlapping representation amongst operating authorities is on an ad hoc rather than formalised basis, and there is not a consistent compensation for this through comprehensive representation on advisory or planning bodies. For example parking and traffic advisory committees have not been represented on CUMTAC or URTAC. Further, formal representation is rarely accompanied by effective consistent influence. (cf. Fig. 4) It appears that formal channels of representation bear little relation to the origin and directions of actual influence.

Amongst government authorities, the Housing Commission has been the most autonomous with no representation on planning bodies, and its own policies virtually unaffected by interest groups from below, or by modification or intrusion from the Ministerial level. In this case formal relative autonomy is mirrored by a comparative vaccum of informal connections. (see Figs. 3 and 4).

The interactions depicted in Fig. 3 suggest that private developers and property-owning interest groups are a strong source of effective consistent influence on the policies and actions of state and local authorities.
Fig. 2 FORMAL REPRESENTATION OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
ON ADVISORY AND PLANNING BODIES
Fig. 3. ORGANISATIONAL FOCUS OF PRIVATE SECTOR, UNION AND RESIDENT GROUP INFLUENCE
Legend:

- Support/Co-operation
- Sporadic Support
- Demonstrated Absence of Support/Co-ordination

Tail of arrow denotes origin of support or otherwise

Fig. 4 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS
Resident groups and unions characteristically have less access to a number of levels of government and tend to focus their actions on local councils. When resident groups are successful in achieving change, it is generally through altering or influencing representation on councils. Councils are most susceptible to becoming the vehicle of a particular interest group, either private developers, entrepreneurs or resident groups. Except in isolated cases, government authorities are relatively immune to opposition from resident and union groups.

Most of the organisations through which private developers have had consistent influence have not substantially constrained (i.e. influenced) the operations of private developers themselves.

Channels depicting a lack of support/co-ordination in Fig. 4, cover a wide range of reactions, from significant indifference to antagonism. Where the lack of support is clearly unilateral, it has been depicted; but it is often the case that a lack of co-operation generates an equivalent reaction from its object.

The network of transport authorities, committees and planning bodies appears to be characterised by a lack of co-operation, in spite of department heads sharing formal membership of URTAC and the Traffic Authority. Individual bodies operate often independently and occasionally autonomously. In this situation it is significant that only the DMR has a history of consistent support from State Cabinet for its policy recommendations. More recently this approval has been qualified and support for URTAC from State and Federal ministers has been increasing.

CUMTAC and URTAC appear to have not significantly influenced the planning of all transport authorities, in spite of their membership consisting largely of commissioners from these authorities. However, their record of winning a degree of support from State and Federal Ministers is certainly more successful than more comprehensive metropolitan planning bodies (CCC, SPA & PEC). Planning authorities have generally failed to establish co-operative
links with operating authorities except with the MWSDB. The absence of consistent ministerial support for planning bodies is marked (as noted previously regarding CUMTAC & URTAC) particularly where their interests are competing with those of operating or construction authorities.

The MWSDB emerges as a focus for co-operative effort. The constraints determining the provision of its services have been acknowledged by relevant Ministers and authorities, and it has support resulting from its prominence in early planning exercises like the SROP.

Local Councils are largely estranged from the operations of public authorities, although in isolated cases State and Federal Ministers have equally been the originators of a lack of support in interactions with planning bodies, despite strong local government representation on the CCC and to a lesser extent the SPA. The Sydney City Council has also remained largely oblivious to recommendations of planning bodies.

Between separate government authorities there has been little co-operation. In particular between the Housing Commission, Department of Main Roads and Public Transport Commission, there is little evidence of consistent attempts to exchange information or synchronise activities according to any shared view of objectives.

Operating and Construction Authorities

It has been argued that the MWSDB has established a pattern of liaison with other authorities including councils, the PEC, Housing Commission, through the implementation of a formal approval system in the planning process. Because the process requires authorities to check their plans against one another with a clear delineation of powers, projects that are patently inefficient do not survive. Some consistency in the provision of a number of services occurs although there is no guarantee
that the location or scale of provision is related to any comprehensive social objectives or consideration of effects. The Water Board and its bargaining position have formalised a process of institutional dominance. This pattern is not necessarily oriented to consumer interests or the most equitable provision of services, but it has imposed a desirable or otherwise degree of order on the process of planning.

Assessment of the Housing Commission's role in planning focuses on the narrowness of its responsibilities as conceived, and as subsequently interpreted. The cumulative costs suffered by residents of new housing estates are the outcome of a legal and administrative framework which fosters single purpose authorities and encourages no particular authority, council or private sector body to take comprehensive responsibility for actions taken. Thus the Housing Commission is a housing authority not an urban development authority, primarily concerned with the provision of cheap housing. Other authorities are relied upon to provide appropriate services but there is little structural encouragement for a number of authorities to co-ordinate their activities with those of the Housing Commission.

The planning techniques of the DMR, it has been suggested, are based on restricted criteria and methods of analysis, and the lack of co-ordination of resulting solutions with the initiatives of the other actors in urban development often produce transport developments that satisfy the needs of only limited sections of the community. Problems are narrowly conceived and consumers rarely consulted. Clearly these solutions themselves create further problems and fail to adequately relieve existing ones. The unfortunate result of the DMR's prominence in transport policy generally, has been the comparative neglect of alternative solutions to problems and alternative modes which lie outside the area of its responsibility, and the frequent interpretation of DMR policy as 'transport policy'. Further, within the general area of transport decision-making, in spite of overlapping formal representation there is inadequate conferring between
bodies deliberating on different aspects of the same problems. CUMTAC, the Traffic Advisory Committee and the Parking Advisory Committee have produced policies that counteract attempts to reduce commuter traffic or to encourage the use of public transport. The existing decision-making process relevant to transport development is fragmented and dominated by single interest authorities.

Planning within the Public Transport Commission has been frustrated by internal conflicts and differing interpretations of responsibilities within a narrow and ill-defined set of objectives. As a result policies have not been evaluated or monitored according to an agreed set of planning objectives. As is the case with the DMR, obvious operational demands and an unawareness of broader objectives have also restricted the kinds of methods of analysis and planning techniques that are seen to be appropriate.

The sequence by which existing urban development proceeds carries no assurances either that the interests of all appropriate service authorities, or all the needs of the potential residents of that development will be represented. One body often a local council, group of private developers or particular government body such as the Water Board or Housing Commission, predetermine the site and scope of development by their initiatives, and other authorities are expected to supply appropriate essential services once a need is obviously established. The resulting situation is one in which single-purpose authorities or local bodies dictate the pattern of urban development without systematic consideration of a series of other perspectives.

In the Sydney context, the Water Board and Housing Commission have indirectly been responsible for many decisions effectively determining transport policy. The projects that result are often a haphazard conglomeration of needs that must be met, created by groups satisfying interests quite unrelated to transport services. To fail to examine the influence and impact of related Government authorities assumes that transport policy is, or should be, a formulation reached independently of other
components of land development. While some services obviously have to be provided before others in development, such as power and water, the provision of other services such as transport need to be considered when such development is being planned. Any attempt to redress imbalances of influence or interest in the existing process of planning urban development, any recommendations aimed at a more integrated process, must be based on a detailed understanding of the interaction of interests that effectively dictate transport planning - interests that are represented by and through government bodies.

Government authorities have been shown to be more and less amenable to co-ordination initiated by planning bodies, and more and less capable of securing the co-operation of other bodies in the implementation of their policy. In both these aspects of co-ordination the MWSDB has been relatively effective. The Housing Commission, DMR and PTC have been less concerned that their policies and decisions are part of a consistent overall policy of urban development. Because these actions are not co-ordinated their implications in aggregate terms are not evaluated, and their effectiveness as an expression of public policy and political objectives is not monitored.

The absence of integration in the early phases of planning is also obvious from these studies. Pressing operational objectives exclude broader planning considerations and restrict the methods of analysis utilised. Neutze has noted that major servicing authorities "Given their service objectives do not as a rule, accept that they have an influence on the shape of urban development" (1). They are reluctant to commit themselves to plans or have planning bodies make decisions for them. The victims of this absence of effective planning and integrated urban policies are often disadvantaged sections of the community to whose needs public policy is supposedly particularly sensitive. Other victims

also include those authorities and bodies which have responsibility for providing ancillary services but which have little effective opportunity for representation of their perspective in planning. The studies undertaken have shown that the failure to develop integrated urban policies, including transport policies, has imposed substantial costs on urban dwellers, transport authorities, and other planners and suppliers of urban facilities and services. Only if some degree of integration in the supply of services is introduced, will demands on the public sector be met more adequately and efficiently than under existing circumstances.

Planning Bodies

Planning Bodies have encountered a wide range of difficulties in fulfilling their task of integrating development decisions. These difficulties are reflected both in the content and implications of the plans produced and in the implementation of those plans. Firstly, it is clear that their capacity to define problems in a comprehensive way has been limited. Information from relevant government bodies has not been readily forthcoming, nor obtained through formal or informal channels by planning bodies. Plans have been pre-determined not by the interests of the consumer but by the priorities of particular authorities. Also, few planning bodies have conducted participation exercises to encourage definitions of problems from affected groups. Problems have rarely been conceptualised in other than the traditional single purpose terms dictated by existing organisational structures.

In its most recent report "The Blue Book", the Ministry for Planning and Environment suggests an increase in the number of points in the planning process, at which public participation and responses should be sought. It is significant, however, that public opinion is formalised as appropriate input after research and discussion within authorities has produced feasible alternative proposals. Secondly, there is little evidence in the successive reports of planning bodies, that a wide range of
solutions to given problems has been systematically entertained. For example, the Sydney Region Outline Plan and SATS although supposedly part of a continuous planning process, effectively considered and reported separately on aspects of urban development which are integrally related. It is not surprising that the solutions offered by SATS conformed to a rigid framework. Had transport implications been drawn out more fully by the SROP, it is possible increased pressures on roads, for example, could have been counteracted by a change in the projected patterns of land-use, restrictions on certain types of development, suitable improvements to public transport systems, and increased attention to improving existing roads.

More comprehensive conceptualisation of problems and possible solutions is recommended in URTAC's recent Report. However these proposals originate from a body with planning responsibilities in a specific area, for a basically short-term action plan for transport. It is paradoxical that those very bodies with a long-term time horizon and with broad responsibilities, capable of making decisions relating to say transport/land use interaction, have in many cases proved ineffective in this regard. The experiences of planning bodies discussed, suggest that there could be conceptual and operational barriers to one body undertaking broad-scale planning with a distant time perspective, given existing organisation structures and thinking.

The kinds of controls exerted by planning bodies have largely been approvals, or otherwise, of fully formulated proposals within a Plan framework. Even where the SPA undertook to carefully examine and oppose specific projects, opposition from developers and government bodies has sometimes been sufficient to undermine the SPA position. In attempting to co-ordinate the actions of these separate groups in urban development, planning bodies have been restricted by their ineffective capacity to influence. Planning authorities themselves have no financial accountability and operating authorities, responsible for justifying particular programs of expenditure, have generally over-
ridden their advice. Typically, authorities with broad concerns have depended on strong Ministerial support to give weight to recommendations often antagonistic to the interests of government instrumentalities and other powerful groups. It is significant, however, that in the co-ordinative phase of planning, as in the initial phases of planning 'problem definition' and the 'proposal of alternative solutions', specific planning bodies have been more influential than bodies responsible for more comprehensive planning.

Effective monitoring of policies and activities has not characterised urban and specifically transport development in Sydney so far. Information on traffic volumes and speeds, for example, is not regularly obtained on other than radial routes and is not readily available to the public. Authorities have not instituted systematic techniques for re-evaluating previously employed strategies and typically the strategies themselves have not easily encouraged or incorporated revision. The kind of planning body most capable of pursuing this function is probably one concerned with a specific policy area; but removed from a strong commitment to specific projects and operations. The latter typically precludes systematic analysis of past operations. Any body undertaking monitoring and adjustment requires an effective system of constraints and penalties for non-compliance.

Utilising the perspective of the private and public transport user, the implications of the shortcomings of existing planning bodies are two-fold. Firstly, the services being provided by public authorities and local councils have not been co-ordinated, and are unlikely therefore to have represented full and efficient utilisation of existing and potential resources. Poor levels of information exchange and the reluctance of many bodies to commit themselves, has aggravated uncertainties regarding future levels of demand\(^{(1)}\). Planning bodies for a number of reasons, have not provided a more integrated framework within which urban development could proceed. Secondly, the recommendations produced and

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\(^{(1)}\) ibid.
advocated by planning bodies have not acknowledged the distributive biases that are inherent in existing processes of policy implementation. Consequently, certain recipients of services are being systematically penalised because independent decisions by government bodies are not conceived and evaluated in a comprehensive framework of public policy objectives.

Councils

Councils substantially influence the provision and distribution of local services in their municipalities, directly through their capacity to provide services, and indirectly through their role in local level planning and the allocation of development costs.

There is evidence to suggest that existing inequalities in service provision are exaggerated by the rating system of local government, which often provides poor areas with poor authorities ill-equipped and sometimes unwilling to ensure that adequate services are provided to those who are most in need.

Within municipalities some councils are more capable and concerned to plan and co-ordinate their activities with other groups. Some have far greater financial, intellectual and professional resources than others with which to ensure that the needs of residents are met, and interests defended. The adequacy and accountability of local level plans tends to increase with the resources of the municipality and its residents. In less affluent areas local authorities often have adopted policies that consistently serve the interests of particular groups, such as land speculators. There have been instances of blatant abuse of local planning schemes to serve certain interests. Residents of these areas in particular are rarely given an opportunity to directly affect the way problems are defined or alternatives considered although local issues are a focus will suited to community involvement.
Councils generally have not shown a willingness to secure a greater level of co-ordination of their activities with those of other bodies. However, they suffer from an evidenced absence of planning since they are often the focus of public opposition. They also often experience a chronic lack of funds and expertise in the face of growing pressures for local improvements.

Council rate bases and policies affect how residents are supplied with local services and who pays the costs of development, such as the construction and maintenance of local roads, within their municipality. However, the nature of local government also fragments planning, precluding the definition of problems and the co-ordination and monitoring of solutions on a wider metropolitan basis. If planning objectives are to embrace a real commitment to equity in the provision of housing, transport and social facilities, a significant redistribution of resources, cutting across local boundaries, would be necessary. A pre-requisite of an effective planning process is undoubtedly some reconciliation of metropolitan and local interests, and an encouragement of the view that local interests may be served through metropolitan ends and vice versa.

Local council preoccupations with local interests has also inhibited the implementation of plans with a broader area of interest. At the same time representation of a diversity of public viewpoints and meaningful community involvement may be most readily incorporated into local-level planning. A revised planning structure should aim to maintain the flexibility and representativeness that is possible through a local orientation, as well as a more comprehensive perspective focussing on problems and objectives that transgress local boundaries.

Other Groups

Private property owners and developers, resident action groups and unions have been shown to have had considerable influence, less through the direct formulation of plans than on the kinds of
development proposals that have been entertained and implemented. Their influence has been felt at a number of government levels, but perhaps most significantly through local councils, concerned with local issues and projects. This focus is explicable not necessarily because councils are particularly receptive bodies. It may be more important to understand it as an expression of the size of concerns and interests around which groups can effectively be organised. Further study of these groups should suggest more information about participatory potential and how it can be successfully incorporated into planning processes.

Private developers have had a considerable influence on the shape of urban development. Prevailing social philosophies that maintain the virtue of progress and the right of every citizen to home ownership, have created a coincidence of developers' interests and a political interpretation of 'community interests'. Owners of large areas suited to development and developers consequently have often enjoyed considerable reserves of political support from councils and State authorities and their resources and status as ambassadors of the private enterprise system, has given them considerable access to influence planning processes. In many cases, unless this political power is checked or counter-balanced, their capacity to oppose the recommendations of planning bodies has given private developers an important advantage in planning not enjoyed by other groups.

However, it is significant that, as in the case with the confrontation with the Water Board, developers can be induced to carry some of the responsibilities for the provision of related services. The DMR has secured the co-operation of private developers in financing certain road and traffic management improvements in isolated cases where existing plans have had to be brought forward to meet demands for development. Prior to any developer changing land-use, he must submit the proposal to the planning authority and tentative subdivision plans to the local authority, which must then be circulated to all concerned authorities. It is at this crucial point that authorities could,
but usually don't, negotiate with developers and demand special development provisions. While these techniques of ensuring adequate services be provided are obviously less than effective guarantees, it is appropriate that developers, gaining substantial benefits, should also be expected to pay some of the costs of particular developments.

To alter the process of decision-making in an attempt to better represent the interests of all groups in the community requires revised thinking and constraints not only within governmental bodies, but also within the private sector. Such a revision could demand scrutiny of political objectives and the kinds of actions that are part of achieving those objectives. A planning process that impels developers and authorities to locate their decisions in a broader framework of responsibility and accountability seems to be a pre-requisite of integrated development and the equitable satisfaction of consumer needs.

With a few exceptions resident groups have been dominated by a special purpose, not geared to structured towards producing general guidelines for the development of the community in the long-term. Without this overall view it is unlikely that opposition to specific projects will provide lasting solutions to problems, since, as in the road widening instance, pressures for road transport will still have to be met, diverted or counteracted in some way. However, this comment is not designed to devalue the perspective successfully inserted by RAG'S in urban development.

Resident Action Groups obviously have the potential to increasingly contribute new perspectives to decision-making that is concerned with the provision of community services. Whether these groups can effectively contribute to the definition and formulation of policies, as well as posing explicit opposition to projects, depends on a number of things. Firstly, relevant authorities should acknowledge the importance of resident participation in policy formulation, not only to generate alternative
solutions but also to reduce the level of conflict that a narrow solution will often precipitate. Secondly, the groups themselves, or the perspectives they have to contribute, need to be inserted into an overall metropolitan planning framework. Reactions that relieve immediate pressures should not create further problems elsewhere that are equally, if not more difficult to solve. The problems associated with sporadic participation and correspondingly fragmented approaches are particularly salient in the context of transportation.

Lastly, unions have had a significant influence on urban development by altering the perspectives represented in existing planning. Their alliance with middle and working class resident groups have directly and indirectly endowed typically under represented interests with a greater voice in development decisions. The actions of the BLF have also set a significant precedent for a participatory exercise organised on other than residential grounds. The fact that some degree of involvement has been generated in issues not specially related to parochial or personal interests, suggests an alternative focus for community involvement. The experience of union 'green bans' has focused attention on the shortcomings of the existing planning process and the inadequacy with which it represents community values. It has suggested the kinds of mechanisms that might be appropriate for incorporating the perspectives of currently under-represented groups into planning, and given a sense of urgency to the development of more effective processes of planning that avoid the protracted conflict of the 'green ban'.

Information about these three groups is a pre-requisite of any approach that is attempting to comprehend and alter existing processes to more efficient and equitable goals. Regardless of how legitimate intervention by these bodies is seen the very existence of Resident Action Groups and union 'green bans' indicates that existing processes of decision-making do not adequately reflect priorities and needs felt by particular sizeable groups in the community. It is apparent so far in this
study, however, that this technique of keeping in touch with community priorities has several significant disadvantages when compared to a framework in which groups are given an institutionalised opportunity to assist in decision-making. The case studies examined indicate that only certain groups within existing circumstances have the resources to organise themselves, and others depend on outside professional and other support to effectively express their interests to policy-makers. These kinds of organisations may not be the most effective and equitable means of achieving citizen representation, and the cessation of specific projects is likely to be a less adequate technique of satisfying community demands, than a strategy which attempts to take account of opposition in the formulation of alternative proposals.

Under existing arrangements unanticipated sources of conflict between developers, government bodies, residents and unionists create situations where conflict is deferred, becoming more intractible when it erupts, costs are exaggerated and solutions made more inaccessible. From the point of view of all those making decisions affecting urban development, the identification and discussion of potentially contentious projects prior to their implementation, would facilitate a more balanced and predictable process of development. From the point of view of the consumer such a process would offer a greater assurance of interest representation; less likely to provoke a reaction of militant opposition from those with sufficient resources and expertise and more likely to meet the needs and demands of those without these resources.

THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED PLANNING PROCESS

of transport services considers both the efficiency and sensitivity with which existing needs are being met. Under existing circumstances often inadequate utilisation of existing services and facilities occurs, services are often not planned before a
need arises and are consequently more expensive to develop, efforts between operators, government transport and other authorities are not necessarily complementary, and services are not monitored according to measures that are meaningful to the community. The second impact is concerned with the distribution of services. Transport development is frequently geared to the needs of those with already strongly represented interests, those possessing the resources and expertise to exert a formal and informal influence on policy decisions. The actions of unions and resident groups are an indicator of salient community interests and values that are being neglected within existing processes of decision-making. Undoubtedly there are other groups with shared needs that are identifiable but which do not provide a basis for strong organisation. Further the groups themselves may not have the resources or expertise to present their case or solicit the support of other groups.

Organisational arrangements currently discriminate against efficient development and against adequate satisfaction of particularly salient social needs. It could be argued that a democratic political system depends on strong interest group activity and organisation to maintain its receptivity to changing values and interests. However, it has been maintained in this Report that processes of decision-making in the implementation of public policy should not actively discriminate against those groups who do not have the resources to organise themselves to compete in bargaining processes. Public policy intended to benefit certain disadvantaged groups should not be counteracted by expediencies and pressures exerted in implementation. The recognition that existing decisions create and perpetuate inequalities, is crucial to the establishment and recognition of the need for an improved planning process. The inadequacy of existing techniques of representing the perspectives of diverse groups has also delayed recognition of, and exacerbated areas of conflict. These factors in turn have had significant implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of services provided.
CHAPTER 4 - NEW DIRECTIONS TO PLANNING IN SYDNEY

ABSTRACT:
Proposals for the redirection of transport planning in Sydney are discussed. Transport planning, it is argued, should be guided by a new set of emphases to replace those described and analysed in chapters two and three. These emphases cover improved representation of needs and interests of a wide range of groups, and the integration of planning. Integration may be achieved through a broad approach to the definition of problems and consideration of solutions, co-ordination towards defined solutions, and monitoring and adjustment of implemented plans. The introduction of these emphases must take into account and modify the skills of existing planners, and it is argued, modify the organisational structure of planning. The advantages and disadvantages of a number of possible re-organisational options are discussed, and a proposal made for re-structuring transport planning in Sydney. Some possibilities for Federal Government action in implementing the emphases outlined are briefly described.

INTRODUCTION

A number of important deficiencies have been shown to exist in current transport planning in Sydney. This has been illustrated using well documented case studies and is generally supported by a recent analysis of submissions under the Transport (Planning and Research) Act 1974\(^1\). This chapter points the way to the kind of changes which are required in the light of the problems which have been isolated. Many of the changes foreseen are the responsibility of a large number of organisations. Therefore this chapter should be seen as a first step to developing more effective urban and more particularly transport planning in Sydney.

The description and analysis of transport planning in Sydney in Chapters 2 and 3 has seen planning within the context of the organisations in which it has occurred. Each organisation studied has been primarily concerned with its own interests, examining issues using internally evolved criteria. Essentially the development of programmes has occurred independently within each organisation. These programmes developed in different authorities have often borne little relationship to each other. There have been examples of co-ordination of authorities, but the overall picture reflects neither co-ordination nor integration of the various aspects of planning.

From the transport planning viewpoint, a wide range of bodies whose activities have implications for transport provision, have in many cases either not sought or been unable to secure the co-operation of the various agencies responsible for transport planning. Responsibilities in many cases do not include or emphasise co-operation. Similarly, transport plans have been developed without due consideration being given to the implications of those plans for the provision of other services. The studies undertaken have shown that Sydney's planning is dominated by limited purpose authorities which pursue their own relatively narrow interests with vigour and determination, but generally neither co-ordinating their activities with other agencies nor integrating their planning solutions. In many cases boundaries of responsibility are respected and co-operation, while having beneficial effects, consists of an often arbitrary bargaining process. The channels for co-operation which do exist are in many cases cumbersome and inadequate. Some of the consequences of this fragmentation of planning effort may be desirable (further work is needed on this point): for example some have argued that separation of functions enhances efficiency of operations. However, the research undertaken has indicated that substantial inefficiency has been introduced into the integrated provision of services through the lack of overall planning, competition for resources, and lack of effective co-operation between authorities. Urban problems are sufficiently complex to defy neat division into
functionally separate units, particularly in the planning phase. Many 'real world' problems do not neatly divided up on the same basis as current planning responsibilities in Sydney.

The fragmentation of planning effort has tended to make the achievement particularly of environmental objectives but also of social objectives difficult. Bodies with discrete and limited responsibilities tend to see broader social or environmental goals as peripheral to their principal task. Environmental and social aims tend to cut across all sectors and tend to require mutually reinforcing action to be taken in more than one sector.

There is need then for a reassessment of planning in Sydney. Transport planning should be seen as one dimension of that reassessment. Key elements in the reappraisal of planning in Sydney are presented below with particular emphasis on the transport sector. A number of the points, however, relate to other sectors. Access to goods and services is such an important aspect of urban planning that development of transport planning along the lines suggested would materially improve overall urban planning. An important component of the strategy discussed includes the need to integrate transport with the provision of other urban services.

The route to systematic and efficient redirection of planning effort in Sydney is not an easy one. It is clear that the problems involved are complex and the path to improved planning beset with difficulties. In this chapter a number of general principles and techniques are outlined, the implementation of which would lead to more comprehensive planning and more efficient use of resources. However, taken alone the approach discussed cannot be seen nor is it intended to be seen, as a total formula. The intention is to develop a framework for discussion and possible modification.
NEW EMPHASIS IN PLANNING

Representation

Planning is a process of representation of needs and interests. The quality of planning in large part depends on how effectively it fulfils the needs of the wide range of groups which exist in society. The analysis of planning in Sydney has revealed a process in which particular interests are represented to the exclusion of others. While any planning process must favour some groups over others, planning in Sydney gives special place to privileged groups which exercises its power by virtue of its key position in the decision-making process and deficiencies in the structure of planning itself. Representation concerns the detailed consideration of the needs, interests and aspirations of the range of groups in the community throughout the process of planning.

Three factors are particularly important in the assessment of needs and interests requiring representation in planning: people have different needs and requirements; people have quite different capacities to influence service provision by Governmental agencies; and some people have needs which are less readily satisfied or conflict with those of other people. It is argued that the planning task should be to increase the influence of those who are poorly considered, to provide particularly for those whose need is greatest and to develop means of adequately resolving conflict arising from different needs and interests. For example, the aged, poor and handicapped are viewed as requiring special assistance to avoid the neglect of their needs. The planner has a role to ensure the expression of these needs in the definition, interpretation and evaluation of problems and alternative solutions. Transport planning should ensure that transport

(1) The emphases outlined could be applied to similar urban areas elsewhere, but are not necessarily applicable to small towns or rural areas.
services to all groups of the community are equitably provided. Relative access of disadvantaged groups needs to be identified and rectified. It is important too, that the interests of those not normally organised be represented.

There are direct pressures from special groups who recognise the narrow perspective of much contemporary planning. Such groups have in the recent past made political demands which have gone into qualitatively different areas to those considered by the planning specialists (e.g. the demand that road construction agencies consider regulatory land-use or public transport alternatives and seriously consider local social disruption). The lack of generation of alternatives from a wide variety of viewpoints which exist in the community seriously limit the options available to the decision makers. Community interest groups have risen in importance recently, often having the capacity to defer or reverse significant planned initiatives. Such groups often possess skills and knowledge which may usefully be incorporated into planning, further they may represent interests which may be under-represented in the planning process. It is therefore both prudent to prevent disruption of programmes and beneficial to the quality of planning to incorporate the views and interests of such groups in planning.

Business interests, including the transport industry, require representation in the transport planning process. Their capacity to defend their position is often relatively strong by comparison with other community interests. Government agencies should therefore place business interests in perspective with the other groups which have legitimate representation in transport planning. Transport problems tend to raise important issues concerned with spatial scale. Representation in the planning process entails the need to represent both metropolitan and local interests.

The existence of conflicting interests is endemic in virtually every instance of planning. To ignore key groups can lead to protracted and divisive conflicts which can be costly to the organisation concerned and to the public. The management of
conflicting interests to produce a workable compromise is an important aspect of planning. Some have argued that a high degree of participation in the planning process reduces the level of conflict, since diverse groups have the opportunity to confront and convince each other of the importance of their problems. This does not necessarily occur, but the credibility of the planning process relies on its attempts to illustrate that it is seeking to represent all salient interests and is certainly not captured by a specific interest group.

The interpretation of needs and interests of particular groups requires different approaches depending on the problem being addressed and the nature of the groups to be represented. A wide range of disciplines are often required to ensure that all salient needs are ascertained and relevant policies and plans developed. The recent upsurge of awareness of social and environmental issues has perhaps understandably been inadequately recognised by planning organisations. Physical planners and engineers, the principal professional groups in the bodies under discussion, in general lack the professional training to measure and interpret many environmental and social issues. There has been recent growth in the development of social and environmental planning techniques which have not been fully taken up by the relevant bodies.

Integration

Perhaps the greatest problem facing current planning in Sydney is the need to supply integrated solutions to very complex problems. The supply of single interest, for example single mode services, without adequate integration with the planning of other facilities, is at the least an inefficient use of resources, or in many cases counter-productive in the long run. Provision of a specific service (e.g. transport, housing) in relative isolation from provision of other services (e.g. employment location):
increases the cost of provision of a given level of services;
creates areas lacking in the provision of important services;
creates continual pressure on authorities to merely react to already pressing problems; and
creates an unnecessary range of new problems through failure to consider the full range of effects of policies.

For example, the Western suburbs of Sydney have been identified as relatively transport or location disadvantaged\(^{(1)}\). In this area, all the above criticisms may be made of the development process.

The achievement of integration requires attention to each stage of the planning process and to coordination. The stages in the planning process are (from Chapter 1):

- problem definition or identification of areas for improvement;
- generation of alternative solutions;
- evaluation of alternatives;
- ratification (facilities acceptance of final plans);
- decision-making; and
- monitoring and adjustment of implemented plans.

(a) DEFINITION OF PROBLEMS

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In most of the existing agencies which were studied in Sydney the definition of problems is in accord with a kind of solution which is anticipated or assumed. Data collection and planning procedures serve to reinforce the kind of solution which the agency provides rather than to assess the most appropriate way in which the problem might be defined. Current statutory requirements encourage limited definition of problems for which the authority accepts responsibility.

(b) GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVES

Planning bodies need the capacity to consider a wide range of alternatives to the solution of particular problems. In the transport field, a wide range of alternatives may be applicable, as transport is seldom an end in itself. In general it is necessary to consider:

- land use changes;
- regulatory and licensing alternatives;
- alternative scales of improvement;
- alternative rates of improvement;
- alternative modes or combinations of modes; and
- making no improvements.

However, seldom is such a range of possibilities canvassed and in many cases inefficient use of public funds has resulted.

(c) EVALUATION

The evaluation of possible alternatives should be a process involving engineering, economic, social and environmental consider-
ations. The incorporation of social and environmental perspectives has been rather slow, as a result some projects have proceeded without a detailed understanding of their effects on particular groups or the physical environment.

(d) RATIFICATION

There are efforts needed to improve the credibility of the planning process. There is a need for a greater supply of information in the earlier stages of planning so that interested groups are not forced to merely react to final proposals. Similarly the isolation of some types of planning from the political process encourages a confused situation in which apparently important planning bodies lack political support. This suggests that ratification viewed as a discrete stage of planning should not be taken too literally. Indeed it is suggested that acceptance of a final proposal depends on establishing credibility throughout the process. Ratification is seen to be as much an aspect of the planning process as a stage of it.

(e) DECISION-MAKING

While it is only a minor aspect of this paper, the formal political decision making processes do not seem to give adequate weight to the integrated provision of goods and services.

(f) MONITORING AND ADJUSTMENT

The history of the development of plans for all or part of Sydney is one of the setting of long range strategies. Other planning has occurred and should not be underestimated, but the role of long range strategy plans has been important. Such plans have undermined the need for evaluation, as projects tend to put forth because they are consistent with a plan, which in most cases ignores the need for priority ordering of projects. The benefits to be obtained from the implementation of parts of the plan is contingent on the uncertainties surrounding the future complete
implementation of the plan. Such planning is relatively inflexibile and inefficient though it is arguably superior to what is conceivable had such planning not been undertaken. There is certainly a need to develop, in sketchy terms, long term contingency plans, but such plans should be seen as uncertain and flexible, not as goals in themselves. There is an unqualified need to develop short term flexible planning, with adequate monitoring and procedures for the adjustment of policies.

In developing a political commitment to specific policies, Governmental bodies have tended to become over-committed to their projects or policies. Having argued for implementation, bodies tend to see little benefit in monitoring the success or failure of their predictive techniques. Yet in this way an important source of information can be lost, planning failures perpetuated and opportunities to learn from successes missed. This is not to suggest that no monitoring occurs: monitoring of some kinds of effects is certainly done (e.g. traffic flows, accident rates) although little of this information is publicly available. What is often lacking is monitoring of the broader implications of particular decisions (e.g. land-use, social or environmental) and monitoring of projective techniques and assumptions (e.g. population growth estimates, traffic estimates).

(g) CO-ORDINATION

Coordination is a difficult concept to define and under some definitions the difference between coordination and integration may be a fine one. The meaning of coordination adopted for this report is made clear in the following discussion of the three types of coordination. Coordination refers to concerted action by a group of bodies towards a specific end. It does not necessarily imply complete unity of aims or consensus between bodies, only that a number of their specific objectives are not mutually exclusive. Coordination may be directed towards any set of ends while integration implies coordination towards comprehensive
definition of problems, evaluation of a wide range of alternatives, selection and implementation of a feasible option, and monitoring and adjusting where necessary.

(i) Co-ordination of the public sector with the generally formally unorganised private sector.

In this type of co-ordination, development initiatives come from the private sector and the action of market forces. The public sector reacts to the already accomplished or initiated development by providing facilities as they are 'needed'. The public authorities act in a similar way to entrepreneurs in the marketplace. They seek opportunities to 'sell' their product within the context of developments initiated by for example, private industry, developers and builders.

(ii) Co-ordination within the public sector towards ends (conceptual or concrete) defined by a hierarchy of organisations or specific power groups of organisations.

In this type of co-ordination a body or number of bodies set the pattern of developments which successively constrain the options available to other bodies, and to some extent to private developers. In one case the most powerful body has the capacity to define its plans, whether these be road plans, water and sewerage, housing or other plans, and other bodies must accept these plans are given. In the other case, a coalition of powerful interests combine to define the pattern of development, a pattern which filters down to less powerful authorities, groups or private interests, at each stage becoming increasingly constrained.

(iii) Co-ordination towards integrated ends.

The notion of integration has been the primary subject of this section. Co-ordination of the appropriate bodies towards integrated ends, as already discussed includes comprehensive definition of problems, consideration of a wide range of solutions, and the capacity to monitor and adjust solutions.
Empirical observation of Sydney's planning has revealed that it conforms more to types (i) and (ii) above than it does to (iii).

Efforts at co-ordination in Sydney planning have been generally less effective than they ought to have been. Transport planning in Sydney occurs primarily in operating and construction authorities, with little co-ordination between either authorities representing different transport modes or between levels of Government. Further, these authorities or departments have generally given scant concern for broad planning considerations. They have tended to define their task, usually reinforced by legislation, in narrow terms, for example, road planning, rail planning or bus planning, virtually independent of other planning bodies. In the interests of efficient use of public funds planning of different aspects of urban areas should be inter-related. For example the provision of employment, shopping and hospitals has implications for transport, and vice-versa. Therefore transport or non-transport solutions may be appropriate depending on the particular problem at hand. A problem defined as a transport problem may be best approached with non-transport solutions, such as land use changes. It is important that road and transport planning in urban areas be integrated with overall urban development policies.

IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW EMPHASES

General

The preceding section has indicated in broad terms the types of new emphases required in the planning of Sydney. These new emphases cannot be achieved overnight, and the precise formula for achievement cannot be spelled out at this stage. There are important political, structural and professional obstacles. This section is intended to indicate, at a general level only, the route to more integrated and representative planning, particularly transport planning, in Sydney. It is recognised that a wide range of organisations and interest groups will have a direct
concern with any redirection of the planning of Sydney. Such groups obviously deserve consideration, and their claims evaluated, as the planning process outlined indicates. However, the consequences in the past of great weight being given to the special pleading of certain powerful interest groups, should not be overlooked if an integrated and representative planning process is to be developed.

Professional Aspects of Planning

Existing planning, especially in the transport area has drawn primarily on physical planning and engineering skills. The implementation of transport improvements whether construction, operation or maintenance almost invariably requires engineering skills. There are engineering aspects of possible alternatives which need to be considered in the planning phase. However, the engineering criteria developed for the determination of transport deficiencies, while useful in some respects, have their deficiencies and limitations. Recently some degree of incorporation of economic expertise has widened the scope of evaluation procedures. However, the lack of wide use of economic evaluation, the imperfect application of if when used, and its lack of consideration of social and environmental issues, have limited its utility.

The consideration of problems and solutions from a wide viewpoint indicate the need for expertise relevant to such a perspective. Problems in urban areas are sufficiently complex to defy their specification on traditional engineering or even economic criteria. There is a general lack of social and environmental sciences in the consideration of problems and the formulation of solutions. Skills in these areas are important both in the integration of planning, and the representation of groups in the planning process.

Problems have occurred in the past both for social, environmental and economic professionals and for the organisations in
which they work. In some cases they have been expected to legitimate decisions already taken. In others, they have been merely used to access the impact of already substantially developed proposals in order to increase their acceptability. Yet, given a co-operative organisational environment, such disciplines have the capacity to assist the development of proposals throughout the planning process. In many cases the organisations concerned have had difficulty in digesting the new form of information received. As discussed later, multi-disciplinary planning cannot be expected to operate effectively in an hierarchial organisation. The hierarchial structure of many planning organisations has difficulty adapting to the insertion of new disciplines which tend to define problems and solutions from quite a different perspective. The tendency for hierarchies to be rigid and inflexible in their commitment to plans decreases the chance for flexible planning to develop spontaneously.

The Organisation of Planning

The current structure of planning in Sydney makes a number of crucial aspects of planning difficult or impossible to fully implement. Coordination, even of the first two questionable types (see previously), was often found imperfect, and approaches to occasional integrated coordination appeared to occur almost as an accidental by-product of other policies. The formal and actual frame of reference of most of the bodies engaged in Sydney's planning was sufficiently narrow to preclude consideration of problems or their solution in a comprehensive way. Little concern was found for policies once implemented. Continued monitoring and review of policy were not the norm, but the exception. Some special interest groups were catered for by the various bodies, but many groups were unrepresented, and lacked the avenues to secure such representation.

All of these criticisms could be overcome in part even under the existing organisation, though it seems unlikely that they could be overcome completely. However as discussed below this alter-
native does not offer the greatest possibilities for improving planning in Sydney. In the following section, three important alternatives for revising the public administration of planning in Sydney are put forth and discussed.

(a) REQUIREMENTS PLACED ON EXISTING ORGANISATIONS

In this type of solution, existing organisations would be expected to expand their capacity, to consider problems in a wide perspective, to consider a large range of solution types, to improve their links with other organisations and various groups, and to monitor and adjust solutions in the light of experience. They would also need to provide a suitable organisational environment for the effective operation of multi-disciplinary planning teams.

(b) A SINGLE MULTI-MODAL TRANSPORT PLANNING BODY

Existing transport bodies would retain full powers over the construction, operation and maintenance of the transport system, while a new body would be formed to plan changes to it. The planning powers of existing transport bodies would need to be transferred to the new body.

(c) A COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING BODY

The planning of the major sectors of Sydney would be undertaken within a single body. For example, water, sewerage, power, transport, industrial location, retail and commercial location and housing would be planned in a single body, and recommendations made from that body to a political level.

It can readily be appreciated that other possible institutional reorganisations could improve planning in Sydney. Further, a number of variants could be developed in keeping with these three alternatives. The timing of implementation of these could be such that two or more types of solution could be phased to-
gether. For the purposes of discussion at this point it is unnecessary to elaborate. The suitability in the terms of this report of a number of these variants can be gauged from the discussion presented.

In the following section, each of the three options is discussed in detail to assess their potential capacity to implement the new emphases in transport planning. The first three stages of the planning process; problem definition, alternative generation and evaluation, have been grouped together to avoid repetition of similar arguments at each stage. Decision-making is briefly discussed in each section dealing with coordination. Ratification is not considered separately, but where relevant, comments are incorporated concerning ways to improve the credibility of planning. Consequently each alternative organisational option, and the variations within each option, are evaluated using the following criteria:

- the capacity to define problems and consider a wide range of alternatives;
- the potential to coordinate the responsible bodies during the planning process;
- the ability to monitor and the flexibility to adjust policies where necessary; and
- the capacity to represent the interests of a wide spectrum of groups with special needs and interests.

Following consideration of each alternative, the mode of operation of the best option is briefly discussed in the section entitled 'The sequence of planning'.

(a) REQUIREMENTS PLACED ON EXISTING ORGANISATIONS

Existing organisations would have great difficulty in imple-
menting the new emphases outlined in the previous section. In defining problems and considering alternatives in a broad way, planning sections within authorities would need to be expanded or joint working parties would need to be formed. Expansion of planning sections in the manner required would be, a wasteful duplication of effort in the different modes and sectors; incapable of being adequately staffed given the scarcity of skilled professionals; encourage rather than overcome problems of competition between modes and sectors; and, be only marginally more amenable to co-ordination than existing arrangements. The authorities see their primary function as the delivery of services or the construction of facilities and their internal structure reflects that emphasis. While it is important that planning receive accurate information regarding the operation of services or the construction of facilities, it is quite contrary to the notion of planning that it be dominated by these interests, which constitute a small set of the total interests to be considered in planning. Expansion of planning within organisations would involve internal restructuring of the organisations to ensure that planning sections could maintain their independence from construction and operation.

Joint working parties within the transport sector and between transport authorities and authorities in other sectors could be formed to accomplish the integrated supply of facilities. There is ample precedent for ad hoc joint action or even joint working groups (e.g. the grouping of North East councils and their discussion with Police, DMT and PTC representatives). In fact the grouping of councils to solve specific problems is regarded as promising. There is an opportunity to build on these limited initiatives with joint officer level working groups, even given the difficulties faced by such groups. Such working parties have problems of accountability and powers, and could in complex cases have problems of size. Their proliferation could create new problems of coordination between the various working parties having different responsibilities. Staff on the working party may in some cases continue to represent their organisation's
view, being chosen by their organisation for their capacity to represent its interests. To be most effective such working parties would need to comprise a multi-disciplinary group organised as a team, with every member having the capacity to work co-operatively with the other members, even when such effort opposed the interests of the organisation for which he or she works. The successful working party must also maintain the support of the initiating organisations, entailing compromises which may be quite contrary to integrated planning. However, genuine understanding and information exchange could increasingly develop flowing from the working party arrangements. Information exchanges, which would exist at all levels within the bureaucracy from senior bureaucrats to specialists, should prove particularly useful and productive. Current working party arrangements developed along these lines could materially encourage greater links between the services provided by the various authorities.

The co-ordination of all the responsible bodies involved in the planning of Sydney remains a serious problem in this type of alternative. The mere range of authorities with planning responsibilities or effects on planning defies effective efforts at co-ordination. While bodies remain autonomous or effectively autonomous, co-operative planning depends on the goodwill of the organisations involved. In the past it has been made clear that reliance on goodwill is a poor guarantee for planning. When fragmentation is institutionalised into the planning process it should come as no surprise that it results in a lack of co-ordinated planning.

The imposition of an enforceable planning hierarchy could encourage the development of coordinated planning. Such a hierarchy would supplant the existing rather arbitrary pecking order between bodies with planning responsibilities. Such a hierarchy could consist of existing bodies at the lowest level, organised into sectors at the second level, and coordinated by a planning body at the third level. The lack of coincidence of formal and actual avenues of influence, discussed in chapter 2, would imply that a
planning hierarchy might be administratively difficult to accomplish. It would also politically be difficult to implement, and only partly encourage the wide definition of problems and comprehensive provision of solutions.

Existing authorities in the transport sector, and incidentally in other sectors have for a number of reasons been reluctant to monitor the effectiveness of their policies or adjust solutions in the light of evidence or opposition. Bodies tend to develop a commitment to specific policies and programs, often against internal or external opposition. They become 'locked in' to policies, it appears to the outsider, quite against obvious evidence of their inappropriateness. Often forecasts made in the justification of programs or projects are not checked to evaluate the effectiveness of forecasting techniques. There is scope also to broaden the range of effects monitored, for example effects on other modes, land use trends, and social network patterns.

The broadening of the scope of monitoring would be difficult to accomplish within the existing institutions, though improvements could obviously be made, and the increased effectiveness of links with other organisations could facilitate monitoring and a flexible stance.

Existing transport bodies have generally represented a narrow range of interests in their sphere of responsibility. At best such interests have been those of the consumers of the services or facilities they provide, at worst they have been the interests of pressure groups acting for a small sector of the community. The proponderance of certain disciplinary groups in transport though well equipped to consider the technical problems involved in construction or operation, has not always facilitated the interpretation of the needs and values of unrepresented groups.

There are a range of problems associated with representation of a broad range of interests by narrow limited purpose authorities:
. the current interests of authorities, implemented by a narrow range of professional disciplines, hinders their capacity to cope with the expression of alternative values or interests. The interests of a range of important groups remain unrepresented or represented in a limited and ineffective way, remaining the defined responsibility of no particular organisation;

. the possibility of influence of relatively under-represented groups is made difficult by the wide range of authorities in which the groups have a marginal interest; and,

. public participation cannot be effective when the authority is constrained to a particular frame of reference and a particular solution type.

(b) A MULTI-MODAL TRANSPORT PLANNING BODY(1)

The body formed would be responsible for all transport planning in Sydney. It would replace URTAC (including UTS) the planning section of the Ministry of Transport and Highways, the planning sections of the DMR, the PTC and the DMT with a single body. A body with this range of powers would probably be situated under Ministerial control, preferably with direct access to the Minister.

It would not be appropriate to precisely specify the division of responsibility between the operating and construction bodies and the transport planning body. However, it is necessary to explain how such an arrangement could work before this alternative can be evaluated. As a general rule it is envisaged that any substantial policy issue would be dealt with by the transport planning body. It would be responsible for identifying transport problems, alternative solutions and evaluating possible alternatives. As such it would need to remain in close consultation with implementation agencies in its deliberations seeking information on such

(1) The discussion regarding this alternative has an urban focus. This report does not consider the impact of this alternative on rural areas.
matters as costs and operating difficulties. The implementation bodies would be responsible for efficient implementation, scheduling, construction and operation of the transport system.

For example, a problem with transport development may be identified in a corridor in the West of Sydney. Alternatives would be generated, perhaps in consultation with implementation agencies. These might include land use controls along Parramatta Road, traffic management measures, freeway construction, bus or rail service improvements, express transit lanes, and regulatory or licencing changes. These alternatives would be refined and evaluated from engineering, economic, social and environmental perspectives, and in terms of their feasibility. Advice regarding costs and possible implementation difficulties may be provided by the implementation bodies. The planning authority's recommendation would be presented to cabinet for a decision to be made and it would become the responsibility of the service, construction and operation agencies to implement the approved proposal.

This paper has been primarily concerned with land transport. There are however crucial links between land, sea and air transport, as exemplified by the difficulties surrounding the Bankstown container depot, the Botany Bay development and Mascot airport. The comments regarding land transport are similarly appropriate to the Maritime Services Board. The inclusion of port planning in the multi-modal transport planning body would enhance its effectiveness, and while this option is not central to the discussion to follow, it deserves close attention. Air transport being a Federal responsibility would not fall to the transport planning body. However, the rationalisation of the transport sector would facilitate simpler State - Federal co-ordination regarding air transport and its implications (for example airport planning).

The evaluation of this alternative considers each of the new planning emphases in turn, and each of the options available:
broad definition of problems and consideration of alternatives,

. organisational structure (planning teams);

co-ordination,

. cabinet,

. inter-departmental committees,

. strategic plans,

. task or regional organisation of authorities;

monitoring and adjustment; and,

representation.

The inclusion of all modes of transport at a State level of responsibility within a single organisation would generally enhance the scope to define problems and consider alternatives in a broad way. Multi-modal planning could and should become instituted as an organisational commitment. However the mere collection of currently disparate planning groups together under a single administration does not ensure comprehensive multi-modal transport planning. Internal division between modes within the organisation may lead to problems of its own. The internal structure of the organisation is important in overcoming this effect. A 'tree' type hierarchy, which may be suitable for some form of organisations lending themselves to strict functional separation of responsibilities, is not suitable in transport planning. The formation of teams of experts, each having different skills to offer, and set a specific project or area for investigation, would assist in overcoming unfruitful and often arbitrary competition between modes, and divisions.
The integration of transport planning with other forms or urban planning is difficult in this approach, but simpler than for solution type (a) above. The planning of the location of facilities (e.g. housing, schools, industry) has obvious implications for accessibility. Transport planners need to have the capacity to define transport problems in broad terms and pose a variety of alternatives, both transport solutions and other solutions, particularly land use planning.

The means of ensuring consideration of problems and alternatives beyond the transport sector is difficult. Alternative (c) discusses the potential role of a comprehensive planning body. An overall planning body could undertake the planning of urban development including transport or it could implement a transport planning body. In the latter case, the capacity of a transport planning body to integrate transport with the supply of other urban services would depend on the policy of co-ordination adopted and on the nature, powers and mode of operation of an overall planning body (see (c) below).

Four main options for coordination appear to present themselves in utilising this solution to its maximum potential: integration at cabinet level; interdepartmental coordinating committees; the development of an agreed strategic plan within which all agencies act; or the organisation of authorities at a task or regional level (where regions could be administrative units or areas defined by the problem at hand).

Integration of metropolitan planning at a cabinet level is not strong in Sydney. None of the five cabinet standing committees is specifically concerned with urban development (after the 1975 reorganisation). The Natural Resources committee deals with land use, yet excludes transport, housing and public works (which includes MWSDB). The Industrial Resources Committee includes Transport, Public Works and Ports, and Mines and Energy, but excludes Housing and land use. In any case alternatives developed in a fragmented way can only be marginally integrated.
at a political level. Political trading within cabinet, while part of the political process, is not able to create integration when such integration does not characterise the planning process which developed the projects concerned. In making important metropolitan decisions, cabinet requires an integrated range of alternatives. Therefore while cabinet may contribute to coordination towards integrated planning (for example through the formation of a standing committee on urban planning) this cannot substitute for integrated planning itself.

The formation of inter-departmental coordinating committees could encourage a flow of information between agencies. However, in the past committees have had limited success beyond the level of information exchange and the informal contacts generated. Representatives of the organisations often see their role as defence of the interests of the organisation for which they work. Without effective staff serving the interests of the committee (rather than their own specific organisational position) these committees tend to perform primarily as arena where the interests of each organisation are respected, with occasional bargaining, compromise and veto.

Strategic plans have been used for the coordination of planning in Sydney. Such plans (e.g. Sydney Region Outline Plan and the SATS plan) have outlined development for a far distant forecast year, based as they must be, on a wide range of assumptions. Projects implemented have generally been consistent with and contributing towards the attainment of the overall blueprint though the plans have been sufficiently general to admit a range of projects, and have been overruled in some cases.

The use of such plans in implementing the planning emphases previously outlined is quite dubious. Past plans have not allocated detailed priority ordering, which encourages the implementation of the easiest facets, success of which may depend on the implementation of projects unlikely to ever proceed. The assumptions on which such plans are based may become untenable,
and the presentation of a single plan does not indicate its sensivity to the important assumptions which underlie it. The history of these plans has indicated that the long range forecasting on which the plans are based has been inaccurate. Being plans which require a high degree of political commitment for their declaration, they are often inflexible, not subject to monitoring and adjustment, and serve to substitute for effective planning based on the most current assessment of needs and priorities.

Organisations seeking a degree of security and clear goals, obviously stand to gain from a plan which specifies their activities for many years ahead. However, such an approach is fundamentally opposed to the notion of continuous representation of diverse interests in planning. The whole process of plan formulation implies needless future commitment, while representation implies continuous attempts to ensure that the interests of all groups have been represented in planning, which can only be accomplished with a flexible policy regarding the future. Through the process of plan formulation, the planners involved are effectively isolated from the important decisions regarding priorities. Public hostility is effectively muted by the abstract distance of those plans. The lack of consideration of resource constraints, has led to the positing of a series of virtually unrealizable projects of a capital intensity way beyond the likely capacity to invest in the manner 'forecast'.

There will be cases in which future commitment will be required, perhaps many years ahead. There is no intention here to rule out such long term planning. However a number of factors require consideration in this context. Long range plans, should not unnecessarily constrain possible options. A flexible process of review should accompany long term commitments.

 Appropriately reformulated, is there a place for shorter term plans or plans with a more restricted area/ scope as mechanisms for coordination? It is clear that a number of the faults of the
plans have not been inherent in the concept of plans, and they could conceivably be improved. Any revised planning would need to allow a range of assumptions, projects to be allotted a priority order, be feasible in all respects, be flexible in its lack of unnecessary commitment to future work, have the capacity to adjust in the light of new evidence, and implement the planning process previously outlined. The attainment of a plan with these characteristics would have great beneficial effects. However on a Sydney-wide basis it would be unreasonably difficult to accomplish and the efforts involved would probably not be worth the benefits accruing. However, in specific localities, for example Campbelltown, such an approach offers promise, and this leads to the organisation of authorities at a 'regional' level.

Regional level organisation may involve regions as formal administrative units which substitute for a centralised administration. This approach creates new problems of inter-regional coordination. Regional planning bodies being smaller than a central planning body may prove less capable of balancing the pressures of particular powerful interests. Problems of political accountability and staffing arise (regional planning may require more staff). However such planning may be closer to the constituency served and more capable of representing the interests in the region, and of the region, than a central body.

Alternative, relevant sectoral planning bodies could organise on the basis of specific problems, for example through the formation of joint working parties at a regional, local or corridor level, depending on the problem at hand. The problems of joint working parties have been discussed in the previous section. While difficulties arise with joint working parties (as outlined in (a) on page 84) their feasibility and effectiveness would be enhanced by rationalisation within the transport sector facilitating multi-modal transport planning.

The capacity to monitor and adjust plans or programmes using a broader range of criteria could be increased in this way. The
simultaneous responsibility for all surface transport modes would facilitate monitoring of the effects of policies on all significant modes, and where necessary adjusting the operating conditions of any mode. The greater use and improved organisation of joint working parties would encourage monitoring of the effects of policies in other sectors on transport and vice versa.

The capacity to represent a diverse range of interests in planning could be enhanced by the creation of a multi-modal transport planning body, particularly if such a body regularly participated with other urban planning bodies on specific tasks through joint working parties. The degree of overlap in the planning for different modes would improve planning efficiency, and would encourage the consideration of modes currently not sufficiently considered (e.g. cycling, walking). With the current organisation, each institution has a constituency of users (e.g. car, bus, rail) and often fails to consider the interests of or effects on non-users. Integration within the transport sector would tend to overcome this failing.

In involving the public, the authority should not be limited to a particular kind of alternative. The responsible body should have the capacity to consider a wide range of solution types. A road authority, for example, in engaging in public participation is generally seen as an advocate of road solution, a multi-modal body could expect and perhaps earn greater credibility than can be earned by a body seen as committed to one quite limited kind of solution. In encouraging public participation there are difficulties in securing sufficient interest among any but those most directly and tangibly affected. By increasing the scope of alternatives considered public involvement can be made more meaningful for the participants and more useful for the agency.

It could still be argued that transport planners should have an interest in transport solutions rather than fully integrated alternatives. However, transport planners have less vested interest in the provision of transport facilities than do the
organisations which construct or operate them. Transport planners generally have an interest in planning rather than operation, and a broad transport body need not see its survival being so closely tied to the provision of particular kinds of services or facilities. The joint working party concept assists in ensuring adequate consideration of non-transport alternatives.

(c) A COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING BODY

Clearly a total comprehensive planning body would be in a position to undertake most aspects of the planning process outlined. This is not to underestimate the great difficulties with size, internal organisation and coordination, coordination of operating authorities, flexibility, monitoring and representation. However, the greatest difficulties lie elsewhere. The political system is virtually incapable of dealing with such comprehensive planning. There are enormous problems of political accountability. Under the ministerial system, policy generation is disbursed throughout cabinet. The monolithic structure would mean virtually a single source of advice regarding urban planning. It seems impossible to conceive of such a system being implemented, striking as it does at the policy implications of many departments and their Ministers.

The options however are not mutually exclusive. A comprehensive planning body could complement the role of a transport planning body, and the role of bodies responsible for other sectors. An interest in integrated planning implies that the powers of such a body need to be increased, while it must remain flexible and responsive. The CCC, SPA and PEC have generally been ineffective and relatively powerless beside the single purpose limited interest authorities. A stronger central planning body while not total in concept or practice, represents an embodiment of an interest in integration of planning in the separate sectors. Such a body would serve as a watchdog to ensure that parochial single sector planning cutting across the interests of other sectors could be prevented or redirected. The bargaining position
of comprehensive planning interests needs to be increased *vis a vis* single mode or sector interests. The PEC has been implied as the focus for comprehensive planning, however the recent development of coordination and priority review machinery in Premier's Departments elsewhere requires closer analysis before definite conclusions may be drawn regarding the most appropriate focus.

Regional planning bodies have been effective elsewhere in specific localities, and the PEC has made initiatives for regionalisation. This type of approach has some obvious advantages but some problems remain unanswered. Regional organisation if merely superimposed on the existing structure will make planning more complicated and create new problems of coordination and integration. The problems of the political accountability of regions remain unsolved. The political difficulties of implementing strong regional planning units which would overlap the present responsibilities of Local Government and State agencies remain difficult to overcome. Nevertheless this approach warrants further attention and empirical study.

(d) THE SEQUENCE OF PLANNING

The discussion of the potential of the transport planning body has implications both for planning in other sectors and the sequence of planning. It is clear that even an enlightened transport planning body cannot overcome deficiencies in the planning bodies responsible for other sectors. Some degree of consistency between sectors is needed, though it is outside the scope of this report to discuss the best means of achievement of that aim.

It is also relevant but beyond the scope of this paper to propose in detail the sequence of planning in Sydney, as this obviously involves other sectors. However, by way of explanation of the method of operation of the proposed transport planning body, some ideas relevant to the sequence of planning are discussed. The
critical issue in focussing on the sequence of planning, concerns
which body or groups makes decisions at each of the phases of
planning, as highlighted by the following questions.

(i) Who proposes problems for examination?

(ii) Who decides which problems deserve examination?

(iii) Who decides whether a problem is multi- or single-sector?

(iv) For multi-sector problems, who decides the composition of
the working party and/or steering committee, and defines the
terms of reference of the study?

(v) For single-sector problems, who checks that solutions indeed
only affect a single sector?

(vi) To whom should the working party or steering committee
report?

(vii) Who should monitor implemented plans?

The answers to these questions affect every aspect of the new
emphases outlined, and are therefore critical to the implementa-
tion of an approved planning process. The questions focus
significantly on the manner in which problems are defined.

A number of groups seem to have clear claims to propose problems
for study: cabinet, cabinet committees, the overall planning
body and the sectoral planning bodies. There is also merit in
the idea that operating and construction agencies, councils and
perhaps even community groups, developers or unions should have
some avenue through which to campaign for the recognition of the
importance of the problems which they perceive. Both represen-
tation of diverse interests and integration of sectors are
clearly involved in this stage. Problems could consist of
problem areas, whether relatively large (e.g. the Western Suburbs,
Campbelltown, or inner suburbs); or corridors (e.g. the Western
corridor surrounding Parramatta Road); or small localities (e.g. Bankstown or a specific shopping complex). Alternatively problems could be city wide (e.g. residential amenity or water pollution).

Cabinet, cabinet committees, the overall planning body, interested sectoral planning bodies or a special committee could decide which problems to address. For problems concerning only a single sector, the decision could be made within that sector. For problems concerning two or more sectors, some type of committee would be required to precisely define the problem, and nominate the membership of a working party and its terms of reference. Decisions on whether a problem was a multi-sector one could be based on whether other sectors sought involvement in defining the problem and the study to follow.

Proposals by single sector agencies to single sector problems and proposals by a group of agencies acting through a working party would need to be perused by other agencies and sectors to ensure they carried no important implications for planning in their sector. In the transport context members of the working party would be drawn from the transport planning body and other sectoral authorities concerned. The working party itself would also draw on the resources and research of the transport planning body.

The working party could perhaps report through the steering committee to the ministers of involved departments and the relevant cabinet committee. The monitoring of implemented plans or programmes would probably best be accomplished by the working party itself.

The proposed arrangements could operate in the following way. The sewerage and drainage planning body, for example might propose that it was experiencing problems in servicing Campbelltown. The transport planning body and the housing agency might seek involvement in a study of Campbelltown on the grounds that the selection of sites to be serviced affected the provision of
transport and welfare housing. The overall planning body might argue that questions both of land use and coordination were involved and seek a role on that basis. A steering committee might be set up including senior staff from these four bodies to define the problem and appropriate terms of reference in consultation with the cabinet committee and relevant ministers for cabinet approval. The steering committee could set up a working party and the working party could report its findings via the steering committee to the relevant ministers and cabinet, having ascertained that no other sector was involved in the proposals contained in the report finally placed before cabinet. The working party would have a watching brief to monitor, and if necessary recommend changes, to the approved proposals.

The sequence of the process defined is of course one still open to wide debate. No final solution could or should be sought in a report of this nature. The ideas presented are intended to be treated as suggestions to facilitate debate.

(e) TRANSPORT PLANNING STRUCTURE - CONCLUSION

The current structure and type of transport planning in Sydney is far from the emphases considered desirable. Problems are defined and 'solved' from a narrow perspective, usually with a specific solution type in mind. Coordination is ineffective. Where the process of coordination exists it is towards ends defined by the action of private interests (e.g. developers) or particularly powerful single interest authorities (e.g. HC, DMR), not towards integrated ends. Three general types of approach were examined as possible ways of reforming planning in Sydney along the lines discussed.

It was concluded that it was virtually impossible to redirect planning in Sydney in the manner discussed within the existing structure. Within this framework however, a number of policies could be pursued to mitigate some of the criticisms made. The improved status of planning within existing organisations, with a
team structure and expanded staff could assist, but would be difficult to implement. Joint working parties were considered to offer some promise. The imposition of a planning hierarchy could materially assist, but the scope to monitor or adjust on broader criteria would be limited. The capacity to represent currently under-represented views is limited but could be further exploited. Overall, these policies if vigorously pursued would produce beneficial effects, but less than those accruing to the creation of a single transport planning body.

The transport planning body recommended would be internally organised into a team structure, to encourage simultaneous consideration of all relevant modes, and to create an environment where relevant disciplines may contribute; coordinated with other urban planning bodies through the formation of task or regional working parties; coordinated at cabinet level; responsible for the monitoring and adjustment of plans implemented; and, able to represent all interests within the transport sector, and through joint working parties, ensure consideration of transport by other sectors.

The overall planning body could not substitute for sectoral planning. However, an expanded planning body with powers to ensure comprehensive, integrated and representative planning in all sectors could facilitate coordination between sectors.

The main features of the recommended organisation are listed below, though in no specific order. Each proposal deals with different aspects of the problems identified. The proposals are for:

(a) the creation of a single multi-modal transport planning body assuming the planning but not detailed design functions currently spread through a number of departments, authorities and committees;
(b) the organisation of that transport planning body into a team structure;

(c) increased power and effectiveness of an overall planning body (probably building on the PEC) with responsibility to encourage comprehensive and integrated planning;

(d) metropolitan or urban emphasis be reflected in Cabinet organisation; and

(e) regional or problem oriented working parties reporting back to agencies involved and relevant ministers.

Responsibility for implementation

The prime responsibility for implementation of urban planning reform lies at a State level. The actual and potential Federal Government role, however, is also very important. This section of the paper examines the potential and nature of Federal Government involvement in transport planning in Sydney.

Three Acts currently cover Section 96 grants for roads and road transport; the Road Grants Act 1974, National Roads Act 1974 and the Transport (Planning and Research) Act 1974 (which covers all transport modes). Urban roads, both arterial and local, and finance for minor traffic engineering and road safety improvements are covered under the Road Grants Act. This Act provides for Commonwealth Ministerial approval for the program of works submitted by the States. It specifically provides that the State submit all urban arterial projects for approval. This includes urban arterial projects regardless of whether Commonwealth funds are proposed to be used in their construction, and includes projects intended to be constructed by State or Local Government. The Transport (Planning and Research) Act provides for project approval of any planning or research item submitted by the States.
The Bureau of Roads in its 1975 Report stated that:

"continuation of project by project approval as at present would be inappropriate because:

(a) the establishment of priorities, project by project, at an Australian Government level is almost impossible;

(b) the current Act allows little flexibility with its forward project planning requirements;

(c) the planning process which we outline in this Chapter indicates the need for intimate local knowledge, and thus program approval would provide more flexibility than the present procedure of approving each project and its costs; and

(d) separate funding of State Authority projects tends to encourage separate approaches to planning and research items whereas increased joint consideration is required if the most appropriate projects are to be pursued."[1]

It is clear that some other means should be sought in ensuring that Commonwealth Grants have a desirable influence on the States, in a climate of assistance rather than confrontation.

The Bureau of Roads recommended that the Commonwealth Government enter into negotiations with the State Government regarding the development of planning procedures to become conditions attaching to grants for road funds.[2] The report states:

"At the Australian Government level the Bureau of Roads should be given the responsibility initially for developing and later for reviewing the planning processes in consultation with individual States. The States would then develop programs of work and carry out such project evaluations as may be required in a manner which reflects these perspectives. The Bureau of Roads would co-operate with the States to ensure that State planning programs are in accord with this requirement. In this environment, the planning process can be modified in the

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(2) Ibid, p. 81-97.
light of experience and consultation with the States. It is considered essential that the Bureau develop procedures whereby they may work co-operatively with the States on certain agreed projects to ensure that they are fully aware of the States' problems" ( ).

Such negotiation and agreement is particularly urgent in Sydney. The problems of Sydney, like the problems of other major urban areas, are to some extent national problems, and the deployment of national expertise engaged in co-operative planning with the States, could make a substantial contribution to their solution.

It is appreciated of course that Federal-State relations are intricately involved, and any approach to a State Government should be based firmly on co-operative endeavour. The consumers of urban goods and services, and their interests need to remain of paramount importance in any discussions. While the discussions may be delicate, the planning emphases should correspond in general terms to the aims existing at all levels of government. Improvements suggested by State or Local Governments or others should be incorporated at the discussion stage.

It is interesting to note that Bland, in his report on the Victorian Public service lamented the lack of strategic planning. He concluded that the very survival of the State Government depended in part on its capacity to undertake strategic planning(2). The same could be said of New South Wales. Federal Governments can assist States develop more effective planning processes.

There are several ways in which Federal Government involvement could be sought, some of which are briefly outlined below:

(1) ibid, p. 94.
(i) The formation of joint (Federal-State) working groups to tackle specific problems could facilitate both increased communication between planners and the effective implementation of political priorities throughout the process of planning. Such working parties are not new (for example the Hume Highway Corridor Study) but offer great scope for expansion into urban areas.

(ii) The Commonwealth could be represented on the board of the transport planning body as was sought under the Roads Grants Act (1974). In this way Commonwealth priorities could be made clear from the outset, as could State priorities and information. It is appreciated that such an approach creates difficulties of accountability, and legal questions concerning jurisdiction. These questions would require careful examination. In the present circumstances such an approach does not appear to be feasible, nor does it ensure continuous Federal-State cooperation.

(iii) If the State decided to form a transport planning body it could be supported in its planning efforts (as distinct from past planning groups like SATS, URTAC, SPA, PEC, and CCC). Commonwealth funds could be channelled through the transport planning body. This of course would obviate the need for specific project approval at a Federal level, and ensure continuous Federal-State communication. The recommendations by the Bureau of Roads for the development of a mutually agreed planning process would complement this suggestion.

(iv) The Commonwealth and the State Government have responsibilities in other sectors besides transport. The re-evaluation of the structure of transport planning should, it has been argued, be accompanied by an integrated programme in other sectors. At the Federal level the conditions attaching to other Section 96 grants could be integrated with conditions attaching to transport grants to ensure that these policies are mutually reinforcing and complementary.
For example housing grants could be made conditional on the provision of adequate access to urban goods and services for welfare housing residents. Whether this were accomplished through a similar planning process approach is of course a recommendation for others to make and consider.

In conclusion, there are a number of options for the Federal Government in developing and improving the State Government planning procedures. The current approach leaves the Federal Government distant from the planning process and casts it as an external 'irritant' through its capacity to defer or reject on a project by project basis. The current approach does not encourage forward planning, is administratively cumbersome; separate funding of state institutions encourages a lack of planning co-ordination; and, leaves the Federal Government without local knowledge to effectively administer the relevant Acts. The fragmentation of State planning creates difficulties for the continued viability of the States.

The measures that could be considered include the following: transport planning process approval rather than project approval; possible Federal representation on the State transport planning bodies; the setting up of joint working groups on specific studies; Federal funding directed through the appropriate authority (namely the transport planning body); and Federal grants in other areas be integrated with transport grants and vice versa.
CHAPTER 5 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

ABSTRACT:
The defects of the existing transport planning arrangements in Sydney are summarised. The effects of the political-administrative environment of transport planning on the provision of transport services is illustrated by reference to specific examples. Other agencies, in meeting needs within their own domain, have given insufficient consideration to transport provision, and vice versa. Within the transport sector there exists a significant lack of cooperation. These defects and others indicate the need for an improved approach to planning characterised by: greater representation of the interests of disadvantaged groups and integration at each stage of the planning process. The implementation of these emphases through creation of a multi-modal transport planning body is discussed.

EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS

Operating and construction authorities act within narrowly defined limits. The Housing Commission, for example, was primarily concerned with provision of cheap housing, without regard to the other costs incurred for consumers of those household services. Independent studies have shown these costs to be particularly significant. The Housing Commission has operated with relative autonomy, and indeed in considerable isolation, substantially influenced neither by other Government agencies nor any other group.

The Water Board established itself as a relative exception, imposing a degree of order on the servicing of land, but not always in the interests of consumers or the most equitable distribution of resources. The PTC has been frustrated by internal problems and pressure to reduce its deficit, and until recently at least, has been in a relatively inferior position with respect to the DMR. The DMR has been an effective and forceful advocate of its policies but these have often been restricted in conception and scope.
The sequence by which existing urban development proceeds carries no assurances either that the interests of all appropriate service authorities, or all the needs of potential residents of that development will be represented. One body, often a local council, group of private developers or a particular government body such as the Water Board or Housing Commission, pre-determine the site and scope of development by their initiatives, and other authorities are expected to supply appropriate essential services once a need is obviously established. The resulting situation is one in which single purpose authorities or local bodies dictate the pattern of urban development without systematic consideration of a series of other perspectives. While facilities may develop in a sequential way it has been argued that planning of closely related facilities should not be undertaken independently.

Authorities outside the transport sector (e.g. HC, MWSB and Councils) have been indirectly responsible for many decisions effectively determining transport policy. The developments which result can often create significant difficulties in the provision of transport services (e.g. in Green Valley and North Sydney). Similarly, the relatively independent operation of transport agencies has restricted the possibility for integration or even co-ordination of transport with the operations of other agencies.

Land-use planning bodies (the CCC, SPA and PEC) have been generally ineffective in the co-ordinating task allotted to them. They have generally been undermined by lack of political support against the powerful single purpose authorities or private pressures and have been unable to overcome their lack of support by establishing a consistent record of expertise. Without spending powers or financial accountability they have been relatively ineffective in directing the activities of operating authorities. They have lacked formal or informal access to information from the relevant construction or operations agencies until too late in the process of planning to attempt more than minor modifications.
While expressing an increasing interest in participation as a means of obtaining consumer views, there is little evidence that this can be particularly useful in view of the tenuous position of planning bodies.

Transport was not adequately considered in the formulation of the Sydney Region Outline Plan. SATS reported separately on transport developments which had clear implications for the SROP. The possibility of reducing the cost of service provision, and increasing the level of service through integration of transport and land-use planning was largely lost.

The recent URTAC Report may signify an important shift in transport planning, though the URTAC proposals are still largely separate proposals and have yet to obtain the complete support of the current Government. The report gives increasing emphasis to public transport, and low cost improvements to the road system. It advocates increasing transport and land-use links. This change in emphasis, and the increasing role of the Ministry of Transport, are generally consistent with the proposals contained in this paper, though less comprehensive in scope.

New Approaches

This report cannot, nor does it attempt to offer definitive solutions to the problems identified in transport planning in Sydney. It seeks however, to establish recognition of these problems and to propose some initial ideas for their solution. The new planning emphases outlined are consequently more confidently suggested than the organisational reforms.

The redirection of transport planning, it is argued, should encourage the following emphases in the planning process.

(a) REPRESENTATION

Planning is seen as a process of representation of needs and
interests, with its quality depending on how effectively it fulfils the needs of the wide range of groups which exist in society. Three factors are important to the assessment of needs and interests requiring representation in planning: people have different needs and requirements; people have quite different capacities to influence service provision by governmental agencies; and some people have needs which are less readily satisfied or conflict with those of other people. It was argued that the planning task should be to increase the influence of those who are poorly considered, to provide particularly for those whose need is greatest and to develop means of adequately resolving conflict arising from different needs and interests.

(b) INTEGRATION

The independent supply of single purpose facilities without adequate regard for the provision of complementary facilities has:

. increased the cost of provision of a given level of services;
. created areas lacking in the provision of important services;
. created continual pressure on authorities to merely react to already pressing problems; and
. created an unnecessary range of new problems through failure to consider the full range of effects of policies.

The supply of an integrated programme of facilities and services requires coordination towards these ends at each stage of the development of that programme. Consultation with the public and related agencies needs to commence earlier in the planning process. Co-ordination, to the extent that it occurs, is generally to meet needs created by the action of the private sector or in response to pressure from more powerful agencies. Boundaries between sectors are often respected, and even information exchange is limited in scope and content. Ratification tends to occur as a means of justifying independently developed projects rather than an ongoing consultation throughout the stages of planning.

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Problems and alternatives tend to be narrowly defined in terms of the service that the agency provides. In the transport area it is generally necessary to consider:

- land use changes;
- regulatory and licencing alternatives;
- alternative scales of improvement;
- alternative rates of improvement;
- alternative modes or combinations of modes; and
- making no improvements.

The evaluation of possible alternatives should involve engineering, economic, social and environmental considerations. The incorporation of social and environmental perspectives has been slow, allowing some projects to proceed without a detailed understanding of their effects on particular groups or on the physical environment. There has been a general lack of broad monitoring of programme effectiveness, and a corresponding lack of adjustment to established policies.

The introduction of emphasis on these aspects of planning, it has been argued, must take into account and modify the skills of existing planners, and modify the organisational structure of planning. Existing planning tends to lack social, environmental and even economic skills, important to all phases of the planning process.

Three broad alternatives for re-structuring planning in Sydney have been evaluated for their capacity to implement the planning emphases outlined: (1) the existing organisational structure; (2) creation of a new multi-modal transport planning body assuming responsibility for the planning but not detailed design of transport in Sydney; and, (3) creation of a comprehensive urban planning body considering transport as one component of urban development.

The existing organisational structure inhibits the development
of most aspects of the planning emphases proposed. However, within this general alternative a number of specific policies would create improvements to the arrangements described in this report. These include: increased emphasis on planning within transport agencies; increased use of the joint officer level working party arrangements; creation of an institutional planning hierarchy corresponding to a more systematic sequence of phases in planning; encouragement of flexible monitoring; and, increased attempts to service the needs of all groups on a more equitable basis.

The creation of a comprehensive planning body solely responsible for the planning of land-use, transport, housing etc, is argued to be a politically unrealistic possibility with immense problems, e.g. size, internal co-ordination and flexibility. On the other hand, increasing the responsibilities of a land-use planning and co-ordinating body (possibly based on the PEC) would place it in an equal position with single sector authorities and would ensure that land-use planning and co-ordination are given the greater importance in the planning of Sydney.

The creation of a multi-modal transport planning body was argued to be the most effective way to implement the new planning emphases. The suggested mechanics of its operation included: a flexible internal structure; creation of a cabinet committee with an urban focus; the formation of joint officer level working parties to tackle specific problems; an institutional commitment to monitoring and adjustment of policies; and, a broader representative approach. The sequence of planning is an important aspect of the implementation of improved planning. Some suggestions were provided regarding how this could be accomplished.

The potential for Federal involvement in the development of improved transport planning has been explored, though only briefly. The main conclusion reached was that planning process conditions attaching to transport grants would, for several reasons, assist in improving the quality of transport planning.
in Sydney and improve the degree of Federal-State co-operation. Several of the possible options for implementation of this policy has been suggested.

CONCLUSIONS

The arrangements suggested have not been costed or evaluated in every detail. There are however reasons to believe the proposal would be less expensive or at least no more expensive than the current arrangements. Critical comments concerning more open consultative planning have emphasised its relative slowness. The suggestions made were intended to make planning more responsive and less bureaucratic. Time would be required to consult relevant groups, and to ensure that some arrangement was reached at each stage of planning. However, the proposals made should prove no slower than the existing arrangements, and delays caused by opposition to final plans should be minimised.

Unlike most transport planning documents which have been produced relating to Sydney, this one proposes that significant improvements can be made to the provision of transport, not by vast programmes of public expenditure, but by introducing new emphases in the planning of the transport system. Organisational reform to accomplish the new planning approach should significantly improve the efficiency of transport provision and the more equitable distribution of resources. This prospect more than amply justifies the entry into the somewhat controversial field: the political-administrative environment of transport planning.